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ABSTRACT 
In May 1998, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices, adding new 
complications to an already volatile security environment.  In the years since these tests, 
the Indian subcontinent has been the site of one war in 1999 and numerous other military 
confrontations, the biggest occurring in 2001 and 2002.  The majority of these conflicts 
have risen from attacks in India and Kashmir carried out by non-state actors based in 
Pakistan.  India thus faces a compellence problem in which it wants to force Pakistan to 
stop its perceived support of these actors, and yet it can only do so to a limited extent for 
fear of nuclear retaliation.  India’s answer, following the 2001/2002 military standoff 
with Pakistan, is the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy of limited war under the nuclear 
umbrella. 
This thesis examines the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine in the context of three 
major areas: Pakistan’s principal-agent dilemma, historical escalation problems on the 
subcontinent, and domestic Indian civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues.  Based 
on the findings regarding these areas, this study will show that Cold Start is not the 
answer to India’s compellence problem.  Rather, cooperation to combat a common foe is 
a more practical solution than mutual antagonism.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, antagonism and distrust have 
defined the relationship between India and Pakistan.  The two nation-states have fought 
four wars in a span of little more than sixty years and escalated to the brink of war on 
numerous other occasions.  Today, instability in the state security realm as well as the 
continued presence of terrorism, state-sponsored or otherwise, and the employment of 
proxies in a nuclearized environment combine to make the prospects of confrontation a 
harrowing one in the region.  Neutralizing Pakistan’s use of asymmetric warfare in this 
volatile climate is the core of India’s compellence problem.  It wants to punish Pakistan 
for perceived threats yet remain just short of the threshold that would trigger a nuclear 
war.   
In an attempt to achieve a greater degree of flexibility for this purpose, the Indian 
military, specifically the army, has shifted to a more offensive posture with the creation 
of what it calls the Cold Start doctrine.1  This strategy, unveiled in 2004, moves away 
from India’s decades-long reliance on defense and corps centric action to a more flexible, 
rapidly deployable force structure that would be employed to punish Pakistan in the event 
of proxy attacks.2  In theory, these independent forces would act both quickly to preempt 
any actions taken by domestic political leadership and the international community to 
avoid armed confrontation and also deliberately to force Pakistani compliance with 
Indian demands while remaining below the threshold of a nuclear exchange.  India 
believes that its ability to respond quickly and decisively to third party attacks as well as 
inflict sufficient, punitive costs on the Pakistani military and state is necessary to deter 
Islamabad’s support of anti-Indian terrorist organizations.  Cold Start, thus, is India’s 
answer to this problem of inflicting cost on Pakistan without triggering a nuclear war.  
                                                 
1 Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” 
International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158.  This strategy is discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
2 Ibid. 
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With the large efforts that India is pursuing to operationalize the Cold Start strategy, the 
following core question can be raised:  Can Cold Start achieve the goals it is designed to 
accomplish or, in fact, do other factors including misplaced strategic targeting, historical 
escalatory issues, and domestic hurdles limit its potential and even make it dangerous for 
stability on the subcontinent by creating a greater possibility of general war in a nuclear 
context?  
Accordingly, this thesis will explore the nature of the Cold Start doctrine to ask if 
it provides the optimum security framework for India, and if it offers the best guarantee 
of stability in South Asia.  Three broad issues undermining the strategy’s potential for 
addressing India’s compellence goals are as follows: 
1. For India, the application of its superior conventional strength as an imminent 
threat organized offensively is a logical course of action to deter a Pakistan-
based threat under the nuclear shadow.  However, as research will 
demonstrate, this argument is not sound.  At the most basic strategic level, 
Cold Start fails to correctly solve the underlying principal-agent problem.3  
Instead of pursuing the agent (proxies), India has chosen to counter the 
principal (Pakistan), operating under the assumption that Islamabad can rein 
in its agents.  Therein lies the problem since, as recent events suggest, namely 
the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, Pakistan-based proxies pursue their 
own maximalist agendas, beyond the control of Pakistan.4   
2. History shows that similar aspects of Cold Start strategy employed in past 
crises and conflicts have led to unintended escalatory consequences that 
neither nation can ignore.  The blitzkrieg strategy and unforeseen Indian gains 
in the 1971 East Pakistan War, the deception and miscommunication in the 
                                                 
3 The principal-agent problem is primarily an economic-based explanation of a situation that arises 
when an agent employed by a principal oversteps his bounds and begins to pursue his own agenda.  
Obviously this model has great applicability to the dilemma facing India.  For a thorough explanation of the 
principal-agent problem, see Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver G. Hart, “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent 
Problem,” Econometrica 51, no. 1 (January 1983): 7–45. 
4 Lydia Polgreen and Souad Mekhennet, “Militant Network Is Intact Long After Mumbai Seige,” New 
York Times, 29 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html  
(accessed October 2, 2009). 
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1986-87 Brasstacks episode, and the potential for escalation during the 1999 
Kargil conflict despite the presence of nuclear weapons, each to be addressed 
in this thesis, are examples of similar flaws in the operational conception of 
Cold Start.   
3. Finally, Cold Start is contradictory to the evolution of India’s domestic 
institutions, both at the government-military relationship level and at the 
military inter-service level.  Civil-military relations have been a complex issue 
in India since partition.  Since 1947, the independence of the military has been 
limited and its input at the state level ignored.  Thus, the Indian armed forces 
have existed in a state where they have not been fully trusted nor their 
capabilities understood.  Cold Start, though, requires just the opposite and as 
such could create major issues for the civil-military divide in New Delhi.  
Historic inter-service rivalry also poses problems that could undermine the 
basic execution of Cold Start.  Although an army-centric doctrine, the strategy 
requires the wide-ranging capabilities that can only be executed by the Indian 
Air Force and Navy.  However, these two services see themselves as fully 
capable and not subordinate to another service.  These attitudes as well as 
competition between the services for resources are major problems for Cold 
Start.  The lack of an effective joint command only exacerbates the issue.     
 In the final analysis, Cold Start is not the panacea that New Delhi needs.  Rather, 
a robust deterrence coupled with diplomacy and cooperation is a more practical and 
potentially successful approach.  While this thesis is South Asia-centric, its conclusions 
have broad ranging implications in this era of proxy war and non-state actor.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
The study of ‘Cold Start” and its implications for strategic security on the 
subcontinent are of undeniable importance.  Instability and security problems between 
India and Pakistan have been an issue for over six decades.  Although the uneasy 
relationship between the two nations was a constant source of tension in South Asia, the 
international community virtually ignored South Asia except during shooting wars.  That 
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all changed, however, with the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the 
spring of 1998.  As a result, South Asia became a central focus of concern for analysts 
and world leaders alike.  In 2000, American President William J. Clinton called the 
region “the most dangerous place in the world.”5 
While the introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent heightened 
security concerns, the underlying dynamics remain the same.  India, the status quo power, 
still wishes to resolve its disputes with Pakistan, namely that over Kashmir, on a bilateral 
basis.  Pakistan, on the other hand, a relatively weak revisionist state with unsatisfied 
territorial issues closely related to its legitimacy as a Muslim homeland, sees nuclear 
weapons as a shield that allows it to utilize proxy and asymmetric attacks while deterring 
full Indian retaliation.6  Nuclear weapons also give Pakistan leverage on the international 
stage to demand a multilateral settlement over Kashmir, ideally in Pakistan’s favor.7 
In this strategic environment, India’s problem becomes how to deter or even 
punish Pakistan for its use of proxies without triggering nuclear war.  Operations and 
tactics used in the past lacked effectiveness, which became painfully clear as New Delhi 
discovered after the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. 8   The 
disposition and structure of the military was not ideal to mount a rapid response to 
perceived proxy threats or actual military aggression.9  Consequently, the Indian Army 
came up with the Cold Start doctrine to give it a more robust capability to deal with 
Pakistani-sponsored terrorists.  From this standpoint, superior conventional forces could 
be used to deter continued Pakistani sponsoring of proxies intent on doing harm to India.  
The forces just had to be reorganized into a more robust and quickly deployable force 
                                                 
5 President Clinton Arrives in Bangladesh for Historic Visit, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/south/03/20/clinton.bangladesh/index.html (accessed October 
15, 2009). 
6 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 49, 169. 
7 Ibid., 49, 169. 
8 Praveen Swami, “Failed Threats and Flawed Responses: India’s Military Responses to Pakistan’s 
Proxy War,” India Review 3, no. 2 (April 2004): 147–170. 
9 S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33, no. 2 
(Fall 2008): 88. 
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that was also agile, and capable of fine gradations of escalation that could punish 
Pakistan beneath the threshold of full scale war.  Nevertheless, the shift of Indian forces 
to a more offensive stance capable of quick strikes into Pakistan is inherently 
destabilizing.  As military analysts point out, Pakistan will not sit idly by while India 
increases it military capabilities.10  As a result, the potential of a security dilemma spiral 
between the two nations is a distinct possibility.  In the end, instead of addressing the 
fundamental proxy nature of the threat, India has chosen to focus on state to state 
coercion, which, ironically, could make India more vulnerable. 
While the significance of Cold Start is evident for the South Asia region, the 
study of its potential effects and its impact on warfare has broader implications.  In the 
current era of warfare, the likelihood of a major state on state conventional war is 
declining.11  Instead, because of the overwhelming capabilities of conventionally 
dominant states, those states are more likely to face asymmetric threats or state-sponsored 
proxy attacks since those avenues offer the best course of action for weaker powers 
desiring to inflict pain on their more powerful adversary.12  This situation naturally raises 
the question: how does a state deal with such a threat?  Is state to state coercion the 
answer when proxies are beyond state control?  Or is state-to-state cooperation to 
mutually combat a shared problem a more logical, though difficult, course of action?  Far 
from being regionally specific, this issue is one that potentially all powers, regional or 
global, may face. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The Cold Start doctrine, in its current form, is designed to allow India to use its 
superior conventional forces to its advantage in the asymmetric warfare arena by 
deterring proxy attacks in the first place while inflicting swift, yet measured punishment 
on Pakistan should initial deterrence fail.  In theory, by creating an offensive oriented 
                                                 
10 Tariq M. Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,” Military Review 84, no. 6 
(Nov/Dec 2004): 58. 
11 Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principle of War: The Future of Warfare,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 269–270. 
12 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005/06): 19. 
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force capable of rapid retaliatory strikes against Pakistan, New Delhi could compel 
Islamabad to alter its relationship with proxy terrorist organizations, thus ending the 
asymmetric threat to India.  Logically, this makes sense, since the other option 
successfully targeting and eliminating elusive proxies and terrorists, is costly, time-
consuming, and not one hundred percent effective.  In reality, though, logic is often 
undermined by human factors, which is the case here.  At the basic level, the question 
remains whether coercion through conventional forces, offensive in nature or not, gives 
India an actual advantage in this environment.  Coercion is a useful tool if an opponent is 
coercible, or in this case, if that coercion can be translated effectively from principal to 
agent.   While New Delhi may wish to blame every terrorist attack on Islamabad, it is 
unclear how much control Pakistan really retains over many of the radical groups it once 
sponsored.13  An entire strategy based on deterring or punishing a state for something it 
may not control is problematic, especially when that state faces internal unrest and its 
own terrorist threats. 
Aside from fundamentals, on the operational level Cold Start has severe 
consequences if implemented in its current design.  The components of its strategy, rapid 
deployment, misperception, and intentional deception, do not have a particularly good 
track record in past cases of Indo-Pakistani conflict.  While India may claim to have 
limited objectives with its Cold Start doctrine, history demonstrates how claims, 
assumptions, and miscommunication can lead to catastrophic consequences.   
A rapid, offensive, independent force envisioned under Cold Start also poses 
problems for India internally on government and institutional levels.  Since 
independence, civil authorities in New Delhi have had a complex relationship with the 
military, often resulting in the marginalization of the armed services in the governmental 
decision making process because of historical mistrust of the military by the civilians.  
Consequently, the military has lacked the requisite strategic independence and initiative 
needed for bold, offensive operations.  While politicians have refrained from intervention 
on the tactical level since 1962, they still control and limit military action at the political 
                                                 
13 Polgreen and Mekhennet, “Militant Network Is Intact Long After Mumbai Seige.”  
 7
level.  While this is certainly understandable in a democracy, this has raised consternation 
in the Indian military, which sees political maneuvering and debate during a crisis as 
weakness in the face of an imminent threat.  A good example is the military’s reaction to 
the 2001–2002 military standoff with Pakistan that occurred following the December 
2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament.  Slow mobilization allowed domestic 
debate and international intervention to limit military action.  As a result, Cold Start was 
created to circumvent just such government action in the future and give the military the 
independence it needs to conduct rapid deployments and operations.  The complex civil-
military relationship, though, raises the question whether this strategy is a practical or 
even possible solution for the problems India faces.  The complexities of Cold Start also 
require institutional-level inter-service cooperation and “jointness” to maximize its 
potential effectiveness.  However, Cold Start was designed as a primarily army-centric 
doctrine and it remains unclear whether the Indian Air Force and Navy will freely accept 
subservient roles.14  Historically, the services have pursued their own agendas and 
doctrines to obtain limited resources due to the lack of an effective joint command 
structure and have resisted single service dominance.  Consequently, service 
interoperability has suffered in the past and remains poor in the present, a major problem 
for Cold Start.  Thus, while a theoretical Cold Start may seem executable, the 
fundamental problems internal to the Indian state tend to limit the doctrine’s potential in 
reality.       
The hypothesis, therefore, is that Cold Start is not the solution to the third party 
proxy challenge that India faces for the following reasons:   
1. Fundamentally, it fails to address the nature of the principal-agent problem by 
transferring responsibility to Pakistan to pressure the agent.   
2. Operationally, strategies and tactics that proved to be dangerous in the past 
form the heart of Cold Start and, if employed as designed, could unhinge the 
delicate security balance between India and Pakistan.  Ironically, in creating 
                                                 
14 Y. I. Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra – a Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine,” Bharat 
Rakshak Monitor 6, no. 6 (May-July 2004), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-
6/patel.html (accessed July 15, 2009). 
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an external threat to Pakistan’s vital interests, Cold Start would force 
Islamabad to focus outward, drawing limited resources away from internal 
security that could combat terrorists and proxies, the same groups India wants 
Pakistan to stop.  The resulting increased instability on the subcontinent would 
be a dangerous prospect considering the decade-long nuclearization of the 
region.   
3. Finally, Cold Start raises complex issues of civil-military relations and inter-
service rivalry that have yet to be resolved.  Without a resolution, Cold Start 
could, in fact, be dangerous if the military presses to utilize a strategy that 
forces New Delhi’s acquiescence to the demands of the armed services during 
a crisis.   
 As stated earlier, although Cold Start is a specific doctrine for localized conflicts 
on the Indian subcontinent, the assumptions behind it are applicable on the broader 
strategic landscape.  If the hypothesis that Cold Start will not deter third party threats 
from Pakistan is correct, then other nations facing the same principal-agent dilemma may 
have to alter their fundamental suppositions regarding the use of state to state coercion as 
a solution to proxy challenges.  Coercion, after all, is only effective if directed at the right 
target.  In the end, only through multiple approaches, including properly executed 
coercion, can nation-states succeed in the asymmetric warfare era.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no shortage of literature regarding Indo-Pakistani conflict.  To address 
the relevant thinking, this review is divided into three conceptual groupings that discuss 
the literature surrounding Cold Start itself, asymmetric warfare and deterrence, and 
finally, terrorism deterrence.  In the end, while a great deal of research has obviously 
been done on conflict on the subcontinent, there are gaps in the literature that this thesis 
will attempt to fill.  As discussed earlier, the Cold Start doctrine, announced in 2004, is a 
relatively new concept.  Because of this fact, as well as limited open source materials for 
operational security reasons, it has not been readily analyzed in academic circles.  
Despite this fact, the few articles that have been written have provided needed insight on 
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the strategy, namely Walter Ladwig’s 2004 article, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The 
Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” which addresses the strategy and discusses 
India’s ability to implement the strategy at the present time.15  Writings by S. Paul Kapur 
and others also explore the nature of Cold Start and the issues surrounding its doctrinal 
formulation and implementation.16  The main argument that the bulk of these articles 
proffer is that Cold Start will be destabilizing to the region due to its likely creation of a 
security dilemma. 
The majority of other articles come from the South Asia Analysis Group, an 
Indian think tank that, according to its Web site, seeks to “advance strategic analysis and 
contribute to the expansion of knowledge of Indian and International security and 
promote public understanding.”17  Not surprisingly, most of the writing regarding Cold 
Start is favorable and contains a heavy Indian slant when addressing the necessity of the 
doctrine and its potential for success.18  From the Pakistani perspective, India’s Cold 
Start doctrine provides the Indian army an offensive capability that “could decisively 
degrade Pakistan’s military potential,” but that advantage does not remain absolute as “a 
change as radical as Cold Start Doctrine necessitates a response from Pakistan.”19  
Pakistan is also aware of the nuclear dimension as “not violating Pakistan’s perceived 
                                                 
15 Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 
16 Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia;” Walter C. Ladwig, “The challenge of 
changing Indian military doctrine,” Seminar 599 (July 2009): 33–37; S. Paul Kapur, “Deterrence and 
asymmetric warfare,” Seminar 599 (July 2009): 52–56; Zachary Davis, Feroz Khan, and Rebekah Dietz, 
Conference Report: Cold Start: India’s New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications (Monterey: Center for 
Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008); Feroz Hassan Khan, “Balancing Military 
Contingencies: Cold Start and Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma” (paper presented at the conference entitled 
Cold Start: India’s New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, May 29-30, 2008). 
17 South Asia Analysis Group, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/The%20Web%20Site.htm (accessed 
July 18, 2009). 
18 Subhash Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html (accessed July 19, 2009); Subhash 
Kapila, “Indian Army’s ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed - Part II (Additional 
Imperatives),” http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1013.html (accessed July 19, 
2009); Subhash Kapila, “Indian Army Validates its Cold Start War Doctrine,” 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1408.html (accessed July 19, 2009); Subhash 
Kapila, “India’s “Cold Start War Doctrine’ Revisited,” 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2293.html (accessed July 19, 2009).  
19 Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening,” 58. 
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nuclear threshold emerges as one of the major constraints in any decisive application of 
Cold Start Doctrine.”20  The Defence Journal, a publication focusing on Pakistani 
defense issues, also addresses Cold Start from the Pakistan’s point of view, naturally 
pointing out its flaws.  Authors, such as its managing editor, Ikram Sehgal, identify the 
dangers an operational Cold Start strategy would pose for the subcontinent, specifically 
the potential for escalation spiraling to the nuclear level, which would have devastating 
consequences for both sides.21  
Just as general academic literature regarding Cold Start is limited, the same is true 
when discussing asymmetric warfare, proxies, and deterrence.  The vast majority of 
writing on war and conflict involves major state on state warfare, conventional or 
otherwise.  Still, authors, such as Andrew Mack, T. V. Paul, and Ivan Arreguín Toft, have 
produced scholarly works that examine how and why weaker powers initiate and 
sometimes win conflicts against superior opponents.22  Kapur, in Dangerous Deterrent, 
addresses the nuclear weapons angle of this literature, explaining that nuclear weapons 
can enable weaker, dissatisfied states to confront more powerful states since nuclear 
weapons provide a shield against full retaliation.23  The theories offered by these works 
can help shed light on the reasons why Pakistan, a weaker power, chooses to initiate 
conflict against a superior rival, India.  Only through this understanding can a proper 
solution to this dilemma be created.24  For Mack, the main issue with which to be 
concerned is the relative stake each side has in a conflict.25  If a weaker power has a 
                                                 
20 Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening,” 59. 
21 Ikram Sehgal, “War-Gaming Nuclear Armageddon,” The News, 29 January 2009, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=159608 (accessed May 14, 2010); Ikram Sehgal, “Cold Start-ing 
Pakistan,” The News, 22 January 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=158401 (accessed May 
14, 2010). 
22 Andrew J. R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” 
World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200; T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by 
Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ivan Arreguín Toft, How the Weak Win 
Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
23 Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 55. 
24 Throughout this discussion, the nuclear dimension must be kept in mind as it adds another layer of 
complication for India’s ability to compel Pakistan to cease its asymmetric strategies.  The nuclear 
backstop inherently limits India’s options to fully punish Pakistan.  Cold Start theoretically opens other 
avenues of limited response under the nuclear umbrella.  
25 Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 13–15. 
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strong interest in a given situation, then deterrence will be hard to effect.  Paul argues that 
a weaker state will initiate conflict when it perceives it has ability to inflict pain over a 
short duration for limited objectives, despite the strength of its adversary.26  Finally, Toft 
explains that while interests and relative power are important, the main factor to be 
considered is the strategy each side possesses and the way it is used.27  While each has a 
different explanation for the causes of asymmetric war, all of these works, as does most 
asymmetric warfare literature, assume the rationality of the actors involved in a crisis, 
meaning that even though a power is weaker, its expected benefits of initiating a conflict 
outweigh the expected costs of such an action.  This is an important point as to the 
potential effectiveness of a deterrence regimen in an asymmetric environment.  In 
general, the absence of rational actors would mean the inability to apply a reliable 
deterrence strategy to a given situation.28   
Although asymmetric deterrence may be possible, the existing literature on the 
subject lacks a consensus of opinion on what form such deterrence should take or if that 
deterrence is possible at all.  Scholars, such as D. Marc Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare, Jean-
Pierre P. Langlois, and Catherine C. Langlois, utilize statistics, logic, game theory, and 
mathematical models to test the potential success or failure of asymmetric deterrence as a 
theory with variables such as credibility and time.29  The results point to the success of 
asymmetric deterrence if threat credibility is high and the time span in which the threat 
would be employed is short.  Otherwise, the results are mixed.  Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding asymmetric deterrence, what is clear, however, is the fact that most 
academics see a limitation in the use of coercion as a solution to unconventional threats.   
 
                                                 
26 Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, `13. 
27 Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 6. 
28 Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence against “Irrational” Adversaries: No Common 
Knowledge” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and 
James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58. 
29 D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” American 
Journal of Political Science 35, no. 2 (May 1991): 305–344; Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, 
“Asymmetric Deterrence,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (Mar 1993): 1–27; Jean-Pierre P. 
Langlois and Catherine C. Langlois, “Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of 
Asymmetric Deterrence,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005): 503–527. 
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As previously discussed, Kapur and Ladwig see the potential for security escalation as a 
result of the implementation of Cold Start and are skeptical that that the strategy will 
succeed. 
Emanuel Alder goes further and identifies what he terms as a “deterrence trap,” 
where a strong actor cannot retaliate fully against a weaker actor because of negative 
social consequences that can actually bolster the weaker opponent’s position.30  At the 
same time, the powerful actor cannot exercise restraint because the weaker actor would 
see weakness in the strong and thus instigate further hostilities.  The question then that 
remains for all of these scholars is how a state can effectively deter a threat in an 
unconventional dominated environment.  Cold Start attempts to deal with this problem in 
a much more complicated a nuclear environment.  India sees potential success in such a 
strategy that would leverage its conventional superiority to punish the weaker Pakistani 
military and state while at the same time remaining below the perceived nuclear 
threshold.  History and other factors discussed later show the potential flaws in this logic.  
In the end, by utilizing Cold Start, India’s compellence problem could, in fact, be made 
more difficult by encouraging aggressive Pakistani counter-balancing both 
conventionally and unconventionally.   
The final area of literature that has relevance for this thesis is terrorism and its 
deterrence.  Before 2001, the extent of the academic literature on terrorism was limited, 
yet after the attacks on Washington and New York, the interest on the subject grew 
immensely.  The majority of academic writing focuses on what terrorism actually is, the 
definition of it, the causes of it, and whether it is a rational or irrational act.  From these 
works arise obvious questions: How does one end terrorism? How can one prevent it? 
Can it be deterred?  Scholarly works such as those by Robert Pape conclude that 
terrorism, even of the suicide kind, is a rational act.  As a rational act, then, in theory, its 
                                                 
30 Emanuel Alder, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,” in Complex Deterrence: 
Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 85–86. 
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deterrence is possible.31  Pape points out the difficulty in trying to isolate and deter the 
sole bomber, instead advocating that foreign presence in a hostile area should be 
curtailed, thus, reducing the incentive for attacks.32  Other works, notably Max Abrahms’ 
“Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” explain the futility of terrorism as a coercive act, 
pointing out that terrorism often produces a greater likelihood of retaliation than state 
capitulation.33  Despite the theoretical value of these works, general terrorism literature is 
too broad for the scope of this thesis.  One of the few terrorism articles that is more 
specific and has more relevance is K. R. Singh’s article, “International Terrorism as an 
Instrument of State Policy,” which addresses such issues as the effects state-sponsored 
terror has on the target as well as the sponsor, the role that international law and the 
international community play in these cases, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
forces and deterrence in this environment.34  Daniel Byman’s Deadly Connections: States 
that Sponsor Terrorism also provides insight on state-based proxies, their use as strategic 
instruments, and the often complicated relationship between the state and the proxy.35    
As for the deterrence, prevention and ending of terrorism, some authors, such as 
Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva’s, contend that deterrence of terrorism is 
indeed possible because of the inherent rationality behind such acts.36  However, the type 
of deterrence, namely military force, must be considered carefully in order to prevent the 
sympathetic rise of other terrorists who view heavy handed tactics as indicative of a 
state’s more ambitious designs.37  Others in academia see the solution to the terrorism 
                                                 
31 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (Aug., 2003): 343–361; Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 2005). 
32 Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 357. 
33 Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Autumn 2006): 
42–78. 
34 K. R. Singh, “International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy,” International Studies 32, 
no. 2 (1995): 119–137. 
35 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
36 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 87–123. 
37 Ibid., 121. 
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problem not on the battlefield, but in the courtroom.38  An effective justice system and 
law enforcement apparatus can be an effective deterrent if used properly.  Finally, 
numerous studies have attempted to explain how terrorist groups end.  The most recent 
and comprehensive was published by the RAND Corporation in 2008.39  Its findings that 
most terrorist groups have reached an end through political means or police action have 
implications for this thesis and Cold Start itself.  In the end, while all these works on 
terrorism and the deterrence of it are informative, their bearing is limited to the periphery 
of this project.  As explained earlier, Cold Start, the focus of this thesis, is designed to 
forcefully compel a state actor to stop its perceived sponsorship of proxies while 
remaining below the nuclear threshold, not the individual terrorist.  However, as the 
government of Pakistan loses more and more control over radical organizations than it 
once had, this strategy may prove to be impractical and ultimately limited in its ability to 
solve India’s terrorism problem. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
In order effectively to analyze the limits of Cold Start as a viable instrument of 
compellence and deterrence for third party proxy warfare, the qualitative case study 
method was primarily used.  To address the principal-agent problem that lies at the heart 
of India’s dilemma, Pakistan’s historical use of proxies as a tool to inflict cost upon India 
is examined, focusing on two broad periods that are divided by the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States.  Initially, the use of third party fighters seemed like 
an economically effective solution to Pakistan’s security imbalance with India.  Over 
time, however, those proxies have become more and more uncontrollable, creating their 
own agendas beyond the scope of Pakistan’s original intentions, especially after 9/11 and 
Pakistan’s alliance with the United States.  It has become what Kapur and Ganguly term a 
“sorcerer’s apprentice” problem.40   
                                                 
38 “Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War,” Harvard Law Review 115, no. 4 (Feb 
2002): 1217–1238. 
39 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 
(Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2008).  
40 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” 
The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (January 2010): 48. 
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As for escalation issues surrounding Cold Start, since the doctrine has not been 
fully developed or implemented, their effectiveness in the real world cannot be analyzed.  
For this reason, an historical case study approach is used to analyze similar events and 
issues that can be applied to Cold Start in order to identify the potential problems 
inherent in the doctrine.41  The first Cold Start specific case study to be addressed is the 
1971 Indo-Pakistani War where a rapid, blitzkrieg attack was launched by India against 
East Pakistan.  The lightning offensive nature of that war is remarkably close in concept 
to that proposed in Cold Start.  In this case, Indian forces moved much quicker than 
expected and tactical decisions were made to advance farther and take more territory than 
originally planned.  Pakistani forces, expecting a limited assault, were quickly 
overwhelmed.  One can see how this could easily be repeated in a Cold Start operation 
designed for deception and rapid strikes.  Unintended escalation and miscommunication 
coupled with the fog of war could result in Indian forces rolling into an important 
Pakistani city, only this time it could be Islamabad and not Dacca.  The implications of 
such an act would be devastating considering the ever-present nuclear dimension.  I also 
study the miscommunication and misperceptions that caused Exercise/Operation 
Brasstacks, an Indian military exercise designed to evaluate mass Indian mobilization and 
capabilities, to escalate to the brink of armed conflict.  The very nature of Cold Start and 
its core logic of deception and the creation of confusion on multiple fronts lead to the 
very real possibility of a repeat of the Brasstacks episode. 
Lastly, the 1999 Kargil conflict is examined as an example of the potential for 
escalation under the nuclear umbrella.  Despite the peaceful resolution of the crisis, both 
sides had planned for an increase in military and combat operations with the possibility of 
escalation to a full scale war beyond the confines of the Kashmir mountains.  Though 
nuclear weapons were on the minds of the leadership of the two nations, nevertheless, 
open combat was seen as a realistic option.  In the end, these case studies will show that 
Cold Start may in fact create an even more dangerous environment on the subcontinent 
                                                 
41 The cases of the 1971 War, the Brasstacks episode, and the Kargil crisis are examined not only 
because of their similarities with a Cold Start operation but also because they each occurred during a 
different phase of nuclear weapons development on the subcontinent.  These relevant cases show that 
escalation, misperception, miscommunication, and deception have continued despite the growing shadow 
of nuclear arms. 
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by threatening the Pakistan state in a provocative fashion rather focusing on the actual 
threat, the proxies.  What may seem as a direct solution to the problem would actually be 
an indirect approach to the true danger.  By centering on coercion of the state and 
employing similar strategies and tactics that have caused great  
harm and consternation in Pakistan in the past, India could, in fact, further destabilize the 
security relationship between the two sides.  In other words, antagonizing the principal 
does not end the menace of the agent.  
Finally, historical analysis is used to trace the evolution of Indian military and 
defense doctrine and its current iteration in Cold Start.  This approach is utilized 
specifically to address civil-military relations, namely the lack of military independence 
and the absence of military input on the governmental level, and inter-service rivalry 
issues in order to show how these fundamental issues that have developed over the last 
six decades of Indian history undermine Cold Start’s effective implementation.    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into two major conceptual categories and is broken down 
into six chapters.  The first conceptual category lays out the problem India faces and the 
solution it has devised in Cold Start.  This first part includes Chapters I and II.  The 
second part of the thesis examines specific problems with Cold Start and concludes with 
alternative course of actions that both Islamabad and New Delhi should take to resolve 
issues that continue to plague their relationship.  This second part included Chapters III 
through VI.  A detailed chapter breakdown is as follows: following this first chapter, 
Chapter II will examine India’s compellence problem under the nuclear umbrella and 
provide a detailed explanation of the Cold Start Doctrine.  Chapter III will provide a 
background of the use of proxy conflict waged by Pakistan against India and trace the 
rise of the principal-agent problem that Islamabad faces in the present.  The following 
chapter will address both deliberate and inadvertent escalation and present case studies 
that examine the potential consequences to stability in South Asia of an operational Cold 
Start.  Chapter V will examine the evolution of Indian defense and military doctrine, 
discussing specifically the institutional problems of civil-military relations and inter-
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service rivalries that undermine Cold Start’s implementation.  Lastly, the thesis will 
conclude with findings that an alternative course of action should be taken by India on 
the subcontinent and by other nations that face a state-based proxy threat, whether under 
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II. INDIA’S COMPELLENCE CONCERN AND COLD START 
The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch 
a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict 
significant harm on the Pakistan Army…[while] at the same time, pursue 
narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the 
clash to the nuclear level. 42 
—Walter C. Ladwig III 
The preceding chapter established the conceptual foundation for this thesis.  This 
chapter focuses on the core issue that this thesis is designed to address: India’s 
compellence problem and its solution to that problem, the Cold Start doctrine.  Since the 
early years of independence, India has faced a proxy threat from Pakistan, mainly as 
result of the unresolved status of Jammu and Kashmir.  Both states feel equally entitled to 
the territory both for strategic as well as ideological reasons.  Despite fighting two wars 
over the territory in the first two decades following independence, the issue became 
relatively dormant in the aftermath of the 1971 India-Pakistan War.  By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, though, the problem once again came to dominate the relations between 
the two states.  Pakistan, the conventionally weaker power, renewed its interest in using 
proxy fighters as a way to inflict pain on India over the Kashmir issue.  India responded 
in kind with its superior conventional forces though these actions became costly in lives, 
manpower, and resources.  In 1998, the emergence of overt nuclear capabilities for both 
nations added another dimension to the ongoing crisis.  India faced a new problem.  It 
could no longer threaten full conventional retaliation against Pakistan because of fear of a 
nuclear response from Islamabad.  The question then arises as how best to compel 
Pakistan to stop supporting proxies in Kashmir and India proper while at the same time 
remaining below the threshold of a nuclear war.  In New Delhi, the idea of a limited war 
under the nuclear umbrella has emerged.  Cold Start, the latest iteration of that idea, was 
unveiled in 2004.  
                                                 
42 Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 164. 
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 This chapter will examine India’s current compellence problem as well as the 
Cold Start doctrine, its present answer to this conundrum.  This discussion will provide 
the basis for the remainder of the thesis that will critique Cold Start specifically and the 
notion of limited war in the shadow of nuclear weapons in general. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On December 13, 2001, five militants driving in a car with Indian government 
markings breached security surrounding the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and opened 
fire using AK-47 assault rifles and grenades.43  When the attack was over, the five 
militants were dead along with six Indian security personnel and one gardener.44  
Remarkably, although the Parliament was in session at the time, no member of the 
legislature was injured or killed.  Almost immediately, Indian officials accused Pakistani 
based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) of 
masterminding the assault.45  On December 18, the order was given to mobilize the 
Indian military against what New Delhi saw as Pakistani-sponsored aggression.  The 
subsequent operation, Parakram (Victory), resulted in the largest deployment of Indian 
forces since the 1971 War.46  Pakistan responded with its own mobilization and was 
quickly able to match and counter the Indians’ massive but cumbersome deployment.  
Though full scale war did not erupt, it would be ten months before forces on both sides 
returned to a less aggressive posture.   
While the attack of December 2001 lasted roughly half an hour, the immediate 
repercussions of that event would come to dominate the Indo-Pakistani security dynamic 
in the short term while the long term impact of the assault and subsequent military 
standoff would help redefine India’s military and security posture.  Despite the presence 
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Publications, 2003), 61. 
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of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent since 1998, India sees a real possibility in 
fighting a limited war in the shadow of nuclear weapons and currently plans for just such 
a contingency.  The events of December 2001 and slow military response, however, 
created doubt as to just how such a limited war should be waged.  Not only did the slow 
pace of mobilization result in a loss of strategic surprise, it also led to international 
intervention that pressured New Delhi to stand down from its war footing.  In the end, 
despite maintaining its forces along the Pakistani border for the majority of the following 
year, India was unable to achieve its original objective of compelling Islamabad to cease 
its sponsorship of proxy fighters.  As Kapur explains, regardless of American assurances 
to the contrary, “Pakistani compliance with Indian demands in the wake of the Parliament 
attack was mixed...[D]espite a temporary lull in cross-border infiltration, the flow of 
militants into Jammu and Kashmir by mid-2002 had begun to increase once again.”47   
Consequently, in 2004, a new limited war strategy known as Cold Start was unveiled.48  
Designed to correct the failures of Operation Parakram, this strategy is a marked 
departure from past Indian military postures and aims to put the military, specifically the 
Indian army, on an offensive footing capable of rapid, punitive responses to what India 
sees as Pakistani adventurism while remaining below the threshold of nuclear war. 
In the following section, I address India’s compellence problem as it exists in the 
present.  Later, I will explain the Cold Start doctrine in greater detail as the strategy India 
sees will solve this dilemma.  
B. THE COMPELLENCE DILEMMA 
As noted earlier, India has faced a Pakistan-based proxy war problem since 1947.  
The current iteration of this Pakistan strategy began in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
when Kashmiris began to revolt against increasing autocratic federal rule from New 
Delhi.  Kapur explains the uprisings as the result of greater political awareness in 
Kashmir coupled with decaying institutions that did not provide a viable outlet for 
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increased political expression.49  For Pakistan, these uprisings constituted an opportunity 
that it could exploit to its advantage.  If the Kashmiris were fed up with Indian rule, then 
they would certainly turn to Pakistan.  Also, Pakistan saw an opportunity to “bleed” India 
by forcing it to commit resources and personnel to combat a widespread insurgency.50  
With these assumptions in mind, the Pakistanis sent in proxies to aid those in revolt in 
Kashmir.  What Pakistan soon learned, though, was that while the Kashmiris were angry 
at New Delhi, they did not want to cast their lot with Islamabad either.  Rather, the 
Kashmiris wanted independence.  Pakistan could not accept this proposition.  Instead, it 
used its proxies, notably the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) to target the indigenous Kashmir 
rebel group the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which the HuM had 
originally supported.  Although the HuM and other Pakistan-supported non-state actors 
eventually defeated the JKLF, they also alienated the local Kashmiri population.  As a 
result, the Kashmiris aided the Indian security forces who had been sent to the region to 
quell these uprisings and attacks.   
Throughout the 1990s, the Indians committed a large amount of forces and 
resources to keeping the peace in Kashmir.  In 1993 alone, between 300,000 to 400,000 
security personnel spent time in the region.51  Ongoing deployments became more and 
more costly, not only in personnel and resources but also in lives lost.  Despite India’s 
commitment, it could not effectively deal with Pakistan’s proxies.  Although full scale 
war was an option, it was not entirely feasible considering the presence of Pakistan’s 
assumed nuclear capabilities.52  This problem would continue to haunt New Delhi as the 
decade progressed.   
In 1998, the significance of this problem grew exponentially when both India and 
Pakistan detonated nuclear devices that May.  As a result, full scale military action 
against Pakistan to coerce Islamabad to end its support of non-state actors or for any 
other reason was now off the table.  The question then was how to coerce Pakistan 
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enough without triggering a nuclear exchange.  Is it possible at all?  For its part, 
Islamabad exploited its perceived advantage, knowing that India could not retaliate with a 
massive conventional attack for fear of a nuclear response nor could it use nuclear 
weapons for fear of international condemnation.  In 1999, Pakistan was emboldened 
enough to infiltrate Indian positions in the Kargil sector of the Kashmir Line of Control 
(LoC).53  In this case, India did not shy away from a conventional response to expel 
Pakistani forces.  Because of the eventual success of the Kargil campaign, Indian 
planners felt that a limited war under the nuclear umbrella was possible.  As Kapur points 
out, “In contrast to its previous restraint, India adopted a policy of compellance, vowing 
to launch limited conventional war against Pakistan if it did not curb cross-border 
violence in Kashmir.”54  The 2001/2002 military standoff, though, exposed numerous 
flaws in that iteration of the limited war concept.  The dated Sundarji Doctrine of the 
1980s and 1990s had to be changed to allow for a more agile, controlled response that 
could punish Pakistan enough to compel it to cease its support for non-state actors while 
at the same time remain below the threshold of nuclear war.  The desired answer would 
come two years later with the Cold Start doctrine.  The following section will discuss this 
strategy in detail.  
C. THE COLD START DOCTRINE 
In the wake of the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan, the 
Indian military, specifically the Indian Army, moved to revise its strategy for fighting a 
limited war under the nuclear umbrella.  Although the Kargil War demonstrated to New 
Delhi that a limited war was feasible, the doctrine to conduct such operations at that time 
was merely an extension of the Sundarji Doctrine formulated in the 1980s.55  This 
doctrine, the brainchild of then Indian Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswami 
Sundarji, was created to leverage India’s superior conventional forces against Pakistani 
aggression.  Designed during the height of the Cold War and NATO’s showdown with 
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the Soviets in Western Europe, the doctrine reflected the tendencies of the day toward 
massive retaliation with large mechanized units.  Under this strategy, seven defensive 
corps, known as holding corps, were positioned along the India-Pakistan border and 
designed to blunt any Pakistani attack while buying time for the arrival of the strike corps 
should war erupt.56  These three strike corps, the offensive muscle of the doctrine located 
in the center of the country, would deploy to the combat zone with the goals of smashing 
Pakistan’s strike corps and then waging a war of attrition deep within Pakistan itself.57  
Clearly a product of its time, the force disposition under the Sundarji Doctrine was not 
ideal for new limited war aims.   
Despite these limitations as shown, no new doctrine was created and when 
tensions grew after the terror attacks in December 2001 and Operation Parakram was 
executed, the military mobilized not according to a new strategy created to fight a limited 
war under the shadow of nuclear weapons but according to plans that were in place for a 
conventional war.  Instead of a rapid mobilization, the Indian Army took more than three 
weeks to concentrate its offensive forces.58  V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney explain the 
reason as follows: 
The Indian Army is…capable of mobilising its holding formations in…(96 
hours).  The armoured formations and its accompanying logistics build-up, 
however…take between seven and 10 days to concentrate for war.  This is 
because India operates on exterior lines of communication, as its strike 
formations are based deep inside the country.59 
The above represents the ideal mobilization evolution that did not occur in 2001.  Still, 
even at this pace, mobilization for this kind of war would have been far too long.  Thus, 
the Indians’ plan to coerce Pakistan into ceasing its support for non-state actors through 
the threat of war was thwarted by the Indian Army’s failure to mobilize rapidly.  Not only 
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was surprise lost but the window of opportunity to conduct a punitive response also 
closed as Pakistan was able to counter India’s mobilization by way of its much shorter 
interior lines of communication.  
Because of this growing tension and before Indian forces were fully online, the 
international community, most notably the United States and Great Britain, intervened in 
order to avert a full scale war.  The United States had two main reasons for its 
involvement: first, it wanted to prevent escalation to a war where nuclear weapons could 
be utilized, and second its war on terror in Afghanistan could not afford a diversion of 
Pakistani forces to counter a massing Indian threat.60  The ensuing 25 days from call-up 
to full mobilization also allowed the government in New Delhi to rethink its options, 
eventually deciding to hold the Indian military back from open war with Pakistan.  
Consequently, the Indian Army found itself in a 10-month morale-draining showdown 
with Pakistan that culminated not in an invasion but a quiet withdrawal that damaged the 
prestige of the Indian Army. 
In late April 2004, the Indian Army unveiled Cold Start, which was designed to 
correct operational and organizational problems that came to light with Operation 
Parakram.61  This strategy would define the way India would wage a limited war under 
the nuclear umbrella against Pakistan in the future.  One of the main objectives of the 
doctrine is to reduce the time it would take to mobilize the Indian Army from weeks to a 
matter of days and hours.  As the failure of Operation Parakram showed, a rapid military 
response to a crisis situation was crucial if India was to maintain the initiative.  However, 
the force disposition of the Indian Army at the time restricted the rapidity of force 
deployment.  The best time the Army could fully mobilize in was a week to ten days.  
Mobilization for Operation Parakram took more than three weeks.  Under Cold Start, 
though, the Army would be able to mobilize its forces and conduct required operations in 
seventy-two to ninety-six hours.62  Consequently, this rapidity would not only increase  
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surprise and confuse Pakistan but it would also prevent the intervention of outside powers 
and limit the ability of the government in New Delhi to rethink its actions after the order 
to mobilize had been given.63 
Of course, the Indian Army would not simply be able to mobilize its forces faster 
because it was put into doctrine.  Rather, the Cold Start doctrine envisioned a new 
organizational structure for the army that would allow for rapid deployment timetables.  
Under the Sundarji Doctrine, the Indian Army was organized into seven holding corps, 
primarily defensive in nature, stationed along the India-Pakistan border and designed to 
hold back a Pakistani invasion.  The offensive power came in the form of three strike 
corps, located in the center of the country, capable of launching devastating 
counterattacks into Pakistani territory, mainly through the Rajasthan desert.64  In the Cold 
Start future, the Indian Army’s offensive forces would be reorganized from three corps 
into eight smaller, more flexible division-sized “integrated battle groups” (IBGs).65  
Along with being smaller in size that inherently reduces mobilization time, these battle 
groups would also be positioned closer to the international border allowing for a quicker 
response in a crisis situation.  As Ashraf explains, “Locating offensive elements close to 
their launching pads for attacks against Pakistan would reduce reaction time and early 
warning normally available to Pakistan.  Placing offensive elements where they could 
immediately launch an offensive would permit the Indian Army to achieve surprise.”66   
Aside from the length of time to fully mobilize three strike corps, the Indian 
Army under the Sundarji Doctrine lacked the flexibility required for a limited war 
strategy.  The offensive strike corps were designed for “sledgehammer blows” against 
Pakistani military forces in Pakistani territory rather than achieving limited goals of 
“shallow territorial gains,” or inflicting measured pain on the Pakistani military.67  On the 
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defensive side, the holding corps did not have the offensive firepower necessary to launch 
counterattacks.  Thus, the organization and composition of massive mechanized corps 
hindered their ability to execute rapid movement necessary in a dynamic, limited war 
environment.  The use of these types of forces also tended to signal the willingness to 
escalate to total war with the objective of destroying the Pakistani state.  As Y. I. Patel 
points out, “by employing or threatening to employ the entire might of its offensive 
power, India would be signaling an intent that may be far disproportionate to its actual 
objectives.”68   
The IBGs, on the other hand, would be constructed for the purpose of limited war.  
These division sized units would “combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor in 
manner reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s operational maneuver groups.”69  With these 
combined capabilities, these more numerous, smaller sized units would be able to attack 
on multiple axes, adding to the element of surprise and confusing their Pakistani 
counterparts.  The smaller size would also signal the limited extent of Indian objectives 
since an IBG would not have the same offensive power as a strike corps and could not 
“deliver a knockout blow.”70  The IBGs could also launch attacks on multiple axes, 
confusing Pakistani command and control and limiting their destruction by nuclear 
weapons should Islamabad decide to employ them.  The Sundarji holding corps too 
would be remade with the addition of armor and artillery to their primarily defensive 
force structure.  These offensive capabilities would allow the holding corps, now “pivot 
corps,” to conduct limited strikes of their own, laying the groundwork for follow-on 
operations conducted by the IBGs.71 
Though primarily an Indian Army strategy, Cold Start would not be successful 
without the integration of elements from both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy.  
As Kapila explains, “the ‘Cold Start’ eight or so ‘battle groups’ cannot undertake 
‘blitzkrieg’ type military without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air 
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support.”72  The Air Force, then, would be tasked with providing that close air support to 
advancing ground forces along with other duties including primary responsibilities such 
as achieving air superiority.  The Indian Navy would also provide aviation assets to aid in 
the execution of a Cold Start operation, giving ground forces what Walter Ladwig 
describes as “mobile fire support.”73  The navy’s contribution would not be limited to just 
air power, however.  The maritime service would also be able to blockade Pakistani ports 
and possibly conduct amphibious operations to open a third front, further splitting 
Pakistan’s defense capabilities.74  In the end, a joint integration of the Indian military 
services is critical to the success of the Cold Start doctrine. 
While Cold Start may seem like the ideal strategy for limited war considering 
both the failures of Operation Parakram and the current environment on the Indian 
subcontinent, the strategy does have its drawbacks.  First, its aim for quick mobilization 
could increase instability in South Asia, since Pakistan would have to increase its 
readiness to counter any possible Indian attack.75  Second, because of the reduced time to 
move forces, the ability of the Indian government to reconsider its actions would be 
limited as would the ability of the international community to intervene to prevent 
escalation.76  As a result, a minor crisis could potentially balloon into a full scale war.  
Finally, Cold Start, though a strategy for limited war under the nuclear umbrella, could 
actually make the possibility of a nuclear exchange more likely.  The increased 
capabilities of the Indian military would put the Pakistani military at more of a 
disadvantage than it already is, thus possibly lowering the threshold required for Pakistan 
to employ its strategic arsenal.77  According to S. Paul Kapur, “Brig. Gen. Khawar Hanif, 
Pakistan’s defense attaché to the United States, argues…‘the wider the conventional 
asymmetry…the lower the nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan.’”78  In the end, 
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Cold Start as a limited war doctrine has advantages as well as disadvantages.  Ironically, 
the push for a more mobile force that is capable of rapid reaction and measured responses 
may in fact increase insecurity between India and Pakistan. 
D. CONCLUSION 
India continues to face a compellence problem vis-à-vis Pakistan and the conduct 
of non-state actors based in Pakistan.  While it has had to deal with this problem in the 
past, the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix makes the compellence dilemma that 
much more complicated.  Because of the presence of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, India 
cannot leverage its conventional superiority for full scale retaliation purposes against the 
Pakistani state.  Still, New Delhi cannot allow non-state actors to terrorize its citizens 
with impunity.  For Indian military planners, the answer then is limited war under the 
nuclear umbrella, specifically the Cold Start doctrine.  In theory, this strategy would 
allow India to utilize its conventional forces in a rapid, yet controlled manner to compel 
Pakistan to end its support for proxies and non-state actors who target Indian forces in 
both Kashmir and India proper.  The efficacy of this doctrine will be examined in the 














III. PROBLEM 1: PAKISTAN’S PRINCIPAL-AGENT DILEMMA 
The government of Pakistan might have abandoned jihad but we have not. 
Our agenda is clear. We will continue to wage jihad and propagate it till 
eternity. No government can intimidate us. Nobody can stop it... 79 
—LeT operative Nasr Javed 
While Chapter II explained India’s compellence problem and its Cold Start 
solution, this chapter will explore the Pakistani side of this issue, specifically the 
development of Pakistan’s reliance on proxies as a tool with which to combat the 
perceived Indian menace and the consequence of such a strategy on both regional 
stability as well as stability within the state of Pakistan.  While there is no doubt that 
Pakistan once sponsored extremist organizations to carry out proxy actions on behalf of 
the state, the question remains as to whether or not those groups are still controlled by the 
state, or if they now have their own agendas, which are damaging to the state.  This 
chapter will attempt to show that a principal-agent problem does accurately define 
Pakistan’s perilous situation in the post-9/11 period as groups once controlled by Pakistan 
have now indeed gone off the reservation, and pursue their own goals, often to the 
detriment of Pakistani policy.  It is counterproductive, then, to assume that a threat to the 
state will compel Islamabad to do what it simply cannot do.  In this sense, the 
fundamental idea of a state-centric strategy such as India’s Cold Start doctrine is flawed. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the principal-agent theory and how it 
applies to Pakistan.  Next, two broad time periods will be analyzed.  The first, the period 
from partition to 9/11, will trace the evolution of Pakistan’s use of proxy fighters against 
India.  The second time period will cover from 9/11 through the Mumbai terrorist attacks 
of 2008, showing that a principal-agent problem has begun to develop in Pakistan. 
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In the aftermath of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, 
Pakistan found itself facing a host of problems, one of the most pressing being a military 
disadvantage compared to its hostile neighbor to the east, India.80  This situation was 
particularly troubling considering the unresolved Kashmir issue, which would come to 
the forefront of Indo-Pakistani relations in the fall of that year.  Because of this security 
disparity, Pakistan turned to proxy fighters, which could carry the fight to the enemy and 
also afford the Pakistani government a level of deniability for its involvement in a 
conflict.81  Over the years, Pakistan has employed this strategy in multiple cases as a 
cost-effective way to inflict pain on India, offsetting its conventional military superiority 
while forcing New Delhi to expend blood and treasure in remote areas it can ill afford to 
lose.82  In the 1980s, Pakistan was able to use this experience to funnel money, 
equipment, and training to the mujahidin who were fighting the Soviet army in 
Afghanistan.   
In recent years, however, the groups that Pakistan once controlled have begun to 
carry out brazen attacks independent of their former masters.  The agendas of such 
organizations as Lashkar-e-Taiba, often maximalist in scope, threaten the fragile stability 
in South Asia and, at times, Islamabad itself.83  This situation has major implications for 
security and development on the subcontinent.  Below, I explain principal-agent theory 
and then show how it applies to Pakistan’s use of non-state actors.  
B. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
The origins of the principal-agent theory can be found in the 1960s, and the 
1970s, when economists and management scholars began to explore the implications of 
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agency theory.84  Agency theory was an outgrowth of risk-sharing research concerning 
how cooperating parties view risk, understand its implications, and often come to 
different conclusions on how to deal with that risk.85  According to Kathleen Eisenhardt, 
“Agency theory broadened this risk-sharing literature to include the so-called agency 
problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and divisions of 
labor.”86  Within agency theory itself arose the specific idea of the principal-agent 
problem, where not only is risk shared by cooperating parties but also by a principal, who 
assigns certain tasks or functions and an agent, who is then charged with carrying out 
those assignments.  As Eisenhardt further explains: 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in 
agency relationships.  The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) 
the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult 
or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.  
The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has 
behaved appropriately.  The second is the problem of risk sharing that 
arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk.  
The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different 
actions because of the different risk preference.87 
Thus, the principal-agent problem shows the lack of control that a principal can wield 
over an agent, especially if the agent is designed to act relatively autonomously from the 
principal.  Consequently, when goals are changed or purposes realigned, it can be that 
much more difficult for the principal to reel in the independent agent. 
Over time, the principal-agent theory has been applied to more complex issues 
that cover a wide variety of fields from management and economics to insurance, 
contracting, and stock markets.  However, the principal-agent problem and its 
explanatory power are not limited to issues of economics and business.  In fact, one can 
see the logical use of such a theory in international relations and the complex relationship 
                                                 
84 Barry M. Mitnick, “Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account by One of the Theory’s 
Originators,” University of Pittsburgh, January 2006. 
85 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of 




that can develop between an international organization and its state members, or, in the 
case of conflict studies, the relationship between a government and the proxies it may use 
to carry out its agendas.  Often the principal and the agent in these dyadic associations do 
not see a given situation in the same context and instead pursue actions that satisfy their 
own self-interests despite the overarching common goal that brought the parties together 
in the first place.   
The United Nations, the European Union, and NATO and their respective 
association with their member states are all examples of the principal-agent issue that 
exists in international organizations.  In these cases, the organization becomes the agent 
in the relationship, a fact that may seem counterintuitive but is logical when one 
considers the sources of funding and resources for the organization are the individual 
member states.88  The organization can have its own goals and policy where it tries to 
foster unity for a common cause yet such aims can be at odds with those of the member 
states, the principals, as is often the case in the principal-agent dynamic.  Since the 
member states provide resources, the organization is thus limited in action by what those 
states provide.89  For example, member states may not want their forces employed in a 
manner that is counter to the national will of their populace.  As a result, the functionality 
and success of the organization, the agent, is severely restricted by the actions of the 
member states, the principals.  
In the case of security and conflict issues involving a state and proxies, the 
opposite situation exists.  Here the overarching power, the state, is the principal and the 
proxy is the agent.  The proxy relies on the state for resources to be able to carry out the 
missions assigned to it by the state.  However, as history has shown, proxies can expand 
beyond the realm of the state, developing their own goals and agendas.  As Byman 
explains regarding the case of Syria and its sponsorship of Palestinian guerillas, “despite 
its utility in the struggle against Israel and for regional leadership, the Palestinian cause 
was a two-edged sword.  As Syria learned, Palestinian guerilla attacks could escalate into 
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an all-out war that Syria would lose.”90  Proxies, which no longer need the apparatus of 
the state for resources and instead have their own sources of funding, can become 
extremely problematic for the state to control.  In the worst case scenario, the proxy can 
turn on the sponsor state itself, seeing the attempts at control to be contradictory to the 
fundamental nature and independence of the proxy, especially when the goals of the 
proxy have gone beyond that of the state.   
The case of Pakistan and its relationship with proxies since independence in 1947 
clearly shows the evolutionary trend as described above.  Initially, Pakistan saw the 
benefits of using proxies due to its conventional military imbalance with India.  However, 
as time progressed, these proxies gained greater autonomy through outside funding and 
began to act according to their own goals, which were no longer consistently aligned with 
those of Islamabad.  Later, these groups began to target the Pakistani state itself, seeing 
the government not as a sponsor any longer but as another enemy that threatened their 
existence.  The following sections will trace this evolution of non-state actors in Pakistan, 
explaining how groups once nurtured by the state now exist independently of the state 
and thus cannot be reined in by the state, despite Pakistan being pressured to do so by 
India and others. 
C. THE PRE-9/11 PERIOD 
Following the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan found itself at a 
great disadvantage compared to its neighbor to the east.  Not only did India receive a 
larger proportion of military forces, a roughly 2 to 1 ratio favoring the Indians, it also 
retained the majority of monetary assets, fixed installations, and industry, the result of the 
British Empire focusing on the center of its dominion rather than the peripheries, one of 
which Pakistan would come to occupy.91  Of course, this distribution was not because of 
some nefarious design to keep Pakistan weak but merely a consequence of the fact that 
India possessed a larger expanse of territory and a larger population.  Still, the fact 
remains that Pakistan was considerably weaker militarily and economically than India.  
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Pakistan’s small geographic size also afforded it little in terms of strategic depth, an issue 
not only for planners looking at the intentions of India but also those who saw a potential 
threat from Afghanistan.92  Along these lines, Kashmir, the small princely-state that 
would come to dominate the India-Pakistan relationship, was seen as potential strategic 
equalizer that could help offset an aggressive India.93  As a result of all these factors, 
Pakistan was predisposed to use non-state actors and proxies to help balance out its weak 
circumstance in South Asia.  The first use of these actors occurred not longer after 
tumultuous summer of partition itself.  
One of the first interstate security conflicts between India and Pakistan was the 
outgrowth of the unsettled nature of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, a small princely 
state sandwiched between the two nations.  The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, 
wanted to maintain independence from both countries and thus dithered on his decision to 
join either India or Pakistan when the British Empire granted self rule on the 
subcontinent.94  Both sides tried to persuade the maharaja to accede to their respective 
sides but to no avail.  The situation was complex and highly charged for both nations 
with the territory becoming more than just a geographic location but a statement of 
identity for both nations.  India, a secular nation, saw the accession of Kashmir as 
necessary to prove its fundamental nature as an inclusive, tolerant state.95  Pakistan, on 
the other hand, viewed Kashmir and its majority Muslim population as a logical piece of 
Pakistan that was founded as a secular Muslim state.  As Sumit Ganguly points out, “in 
essence, Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir was and remains irredentist.”96   
By the fall of 1947, the situation turned violent as Pakistan saw an opportunity to 
resolve the Kashmir issue in its favor.  Pakistan-supported proxies crossed the border 
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with Kashmir in late October to aid a tribal rebellion that had begun in the northwest 
region of the territory.97  Pakistani soldiers in tribal garb traveled with the proxies, 
mainly Pathans.98  The invaders quickly swept through the minimal defenses of the 
Jammu and Kashmir State Forces and were pressing onward to Srinagar, the capital, 
when the maharaja realized the dire situation he faced.  Only two days had passed since 
the tribesmen crossed into Kashmir.  The maharaja quickly called on New Delhi for aid 
to repel the invasion.  New Delhi agreed to send troops but only after Hari Singh agreed 
to sign the Instrument of Accession, which would make Kashmir a part of India.99  A 
plebiscite was to be held at a later date to ratify the accession.  Once the document was 
signed, forces from India were dispatched to the beleaguered region.  Combat broke out 
between the Indian and the proxy militias in November 1947.100  Indian forces were able 
to halt the invasion and drive back the militias, though they were unable to totally rid 
Kashmir of the threat.  In January 1948, India officially filed a complaint with the United 
Nations over the situation.101  Fighting continued throughout much of the year, with the 
Pakistani Army assuming more responsibility of a combat role as time progressed.  By 
the end of December, both parties had agreed to the terms of a ceasefire.  In the end, the 
invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 resolved nothing.  Neither side achieved a palpable 
victory in this first war between India and Pakistan.  For the Pakistanis, ironically, as 
Ganguly points out, “Pakistan may well have been able to obtain Kashmir if it had not 
acted so precipitously.”102 
The case of the First Kashmir War is notable for this study for two reasons.  First, 
one can see the direct hand of Pakistan in the crisis supporting its proxies.  According to 
Arif Jamal:  
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It is unclear when the planning for the operation began, but it was clearly 
the work of elements of the Pakistani military…  Pakistani army 
personnel…ran the Kashmiri militants’ radio operations.  They used army 
receivers to relay messages and organize encampments inside Pakistan.  
The Army also supplied food, uniforms, arms, and ammunition through a 
variety of off-the-books methods, including ‘such subterfuges as the ‘loss’ 
of ammunition shipments.’  The minister of health in Sindh also appealed 
‘to all trained and demobilised soldiers to proceed as volunteers to the 
Kashmir front.’103 
Unlike future crises, the Pakistani military was directly involved in the support of its 
proxies as they carried out operations that the state directed.  Despite this involvement, 
the conflict also foreshadowed the problems that could arise when relying on forces not 
fully answerable to the state.  In Kashmir, the invading militias carried out countless 
atrocities against the civilian population, including robbery, rape, and murder.104  As a 
result, the local populace, rather than welcome the invaders as liberators, turned against 
them in many villages that were subjected to such mayhem.105  In the end, the First 
Kashmir War showed the extent and limitations of non-state actors used in the service of 
the Pakistani state.  
In 1965, Pakistan once again turned to proxies to further its policies in Kashmir.  
To Pakistan, India was in a weakened state following the death of Prime Minister Nehru 
in 1964, and having lost a war to China in 1962.106  The situation in Jammu and Kashmir 
had also deteriorated.  Although Nehru had promised to hold a plebiscite to fully 
legitimize Kashmir’s accession to India following the 1947–48 War, conditions on the 
ground never materialized, which would guarantee such an action would favor India.107  
Moreover, during the years since the 1947–48 War, Kashmir had become an “inseparable  
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and integral part of the India,” and thus, by 1964, a popular referendum was no longer 
seen as necessary.108  India took actions to remove the special political status of Kashmir, 
in the process angering the Kashmir populace.   
Pakistan saw an opportunity in the growing disenchantment with Indian rule to 
foment a popular uprising in Kashmir.  Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ahmed “saw that 
India was in a highly vulnerable position.  A feeling of popular revolt…was sweeping the 
valley, making India’s position indefensible.  If the Indian forces were diverted by 
sabotage and subjected to armed harassment…Kashmir could soon be liberated.”109  
Armed clashes in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 demonstrated to Pakistan that India 
lacked the will to respond in force to a territorial incursion and thus inferred that an 
Indian response to similar actions in Kashmir would be minimal and restrained.110   
Consequently, Pakistan decided to move forward with Operation Gibraltar, a 
military plan designed to create a widespread rebellion within Kashmir.  In August, 
forces consisting of guerrillas and irregulars led by Pakistani military officers crossed the 
ceasefire line into Indian-controlled Kashmir.111  Almost immediately, these forces 
encountered difficulties.  Some were turned in by locals to Indian authorities while others 
foundered against the harsh mountain terrain.112  Although a few guerrilla forces were 
successful in their attacks on Indian forces, by mid-August the Indian military had 
countered the infiltration and gained the upper hand.  Pakistan subsequently launched 
Operation Grand Slam, a conventional operation, to help buy time for the forces 
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time combining actions in Kashmir with an invasion across the international border in 
Punjab.114  War between Indian and Pakistan raged for two and half weeks, ending with a 
ceasefire on September 23, 1965.115   
In the end, the 1965 War showed that Pakistan still was more than willing to use 
proxies to further its goals in Kashmir.  Planning and discussion of operations such as 
Gibraltar continued to occur at high levels of the Pakistani government.116  The use of 
non-state actors was clearly seen as another tool in the arsenal of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy.  However, Pakistan did learn from the First Kashmir War.  Unlike that episode, 
Pakistan kept firm control over its non-state actors, as evidenced by the lack of atrocities 
committed by these forces.  The goals of such interventions still eluded Pakistan.  Despite 
dissatisfaction with Indian rule, the Kashmiris did not rise in revolt in conjunction with 
the arrival of guerrillas from Pakistan.117  Regardless of this outcome, Pakistan continued 
to try to influence public sentiment in Kashmir by sending clandestine operatives into the 
region long after the 1965 War ended.118  By the 1980s, though, external events would 
allow Pakistan to expand its sponsorship of non-state actors from a Kashmir focus to a 
more regional approach. 
On December 24, 1979, the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan.  The impact of 
the subsequent occupation was a boon for the Pakistani defense and intelligence 
establishments.  Over that decade, mujahedeen fighters, resources, and money would 
pour into Pakistan, the base for operations against the Soviets.  The United States and 
Saudi Arabia were the main contributors to the effort.119  Pakistan’s Inter-services 
Intelligence agency (ISI) and military reaped the benefits of the increase in funding and 
by the end of the Soviet occupation, Islamabad was in a position to shape the post-war 
environment in its favor.  Through its support of the mujahedeen fighters, Pakistan 
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gained leverage not only in Afghanistan but in Kashmir as well.  Islamists that had 
defeated a superpower could now be redirected against Indian rule in Kashmir.120  
According to Mariam Abou Zahab, the early 1990s “witnessed an ‘Afghanization’ of the 
struggle.”121  Training camps established for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan became 
training camps for volunteers who wanted to fight a jihad in Kashmir.  As Steve Coll 
points out, “the Kashmiri volunteers trained side by side with the Arab jihadists… 
Kashmir guerrillas” used “weapons siphoned from the Afghan pipeline.”122   
In Afghanistan itself, Pakistan tried to find a mujahedeen faction to back that 
could potentially become a proxy for Islamabad in Kabul.  After the withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union, without a common enemy, the various Islamist groups turned on each 
other, vying for positions of power.  Initially Islamabad, specifically the ISI, supported 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction, a group that had received the majority of funding from 
the ISI during the war.  However, as time progressed, Hekmatyar appeared less and less 
likely to emerge as an influential leader in Kabul.  By the mid-1990s, an upstart group 
known as the Taliban began to sweep across Afghanistan, consolidating power at a 
surprising pace.  Islamabad, wanting to maintain its influence in Afghanistan, moved to 
support them.123  By the end of the 1990s, the Taliban occupied the majority of the 
Afghan state.  Though Pakistan now had influence in Kabul, its links to the Taliban 
government would soon become a liability.   
Although Pakistan increased its influence regionally in the 1990s through its use 
of proxies, ironically, that decade also saw greater autonomy exercised by those proxies.  
Eventually, those proxies would come to threaten their masters in Islamabad.  In 
Kashmir, as stated earlier, Pakistan was able to use the fighters and resources it had 
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nurtured during the 1980s to once again encourage separatist elements within the state to 
take action against Indian forces.  The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an increase of 
discontent in Kashmir as a result of the domineering Indian policy toward the region.  
Local organizations, such as the JKLF, pushed back against Indian rule, not desiring 
accession to Pakistan but a separate state altogether.124  Despite these differences, 
Pakistan and the ISI gave resources to the JKLF as a way to gain leverage within the 
independence movement and hopefully sway it to Pakistan’s favor.  When that did not 
happen, the ISI shifted its support to the HuM, which supported Pakistan’s quest for 
Kashmir.125  HuM and other jihadi organizations, including LeT, brutally attacked the 
JKLF and other pro-independence groups as well as moderate Muslim Kashmiris.126  
Although Pakistan supported these jihadi groups with funding and training, the 
consequences of a relationship with such groups became evident when, in 1993, the 
United States threatened Islamabad with the possibility of declaring Pakistan a terrorist 
state if it could not “rein in militant organizations in Jammu and Kashmir.”127  While the 
ISI tried to increase its power over the organizations by forcing them to join political 
parties, the jihadis, especially HuM, balked at the maneuver and began to cut ties with 
Islamabad.    
Similar experiences occurred with the Taliban.  During the years following the 
Taliban’s establishment of a government in Kabul, Pakistan tried to gain favor by helping 
to rebuild infrastructure, including roads, airports, telecommunications, and other 
services.128  Economic assistance was also provided.  Although Islamabad had some 
influence, the Taliban did not respond well to attempts at direct control.  As Ahmed 
Rashid explains:  
Despite these efforts to help and control the Taliban, they were nobody’s 
puppets and they resisted every attempt by Islamabad to pull their 
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strings…As the Taliban movement expanded, it became increasingly 
unclear as to who was driving whom.  Pakistan, rather than being the 
master of the Taliban, was instead becoming its victim.129 
Even with the intransigence of the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support them as a 
means to achieve “strategic depth” in the region.130  This notion was not driven solely by 
military considerations, though.  A stable Afghanistan would also help reduce tensions in 
Pakistan’s border provinces, and encourage economic development between the two 
nations, thus reducing overall security concerns.  Ironically, Pakistan’s backing of the 
Taliban for this purpose would result in just the opposite. 
In sum, the period preceding the turn of the twenty-first century witnessed 
Pakistan’s use of proxies and non-state actors as an extension of its defense and military 
policy.  Logically, such a strategy made sense for nation facing a conventional military 
deficit when compared with its archrival neighbor.  However, the use of proxies also 
posed particular problems, as these groups increasingly acted on their own, often in 
opposition to the interests of Islamabad.  Despite these underlying issues, as well as 
outside pressure to curtail proxy activities, Pakistan continued to offer covert support to 
its non-state actors.  It was not until the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the start of 
the American military action in the region that forced Islamabad to change its course 
regarding proxies.  As a result, a principal-agent problem that had been developing 
between Pakistan and its proxies came into full realization. 
D. THE POST-9/11 ERA 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, American leaders moved 
to bolster support in South Asia for its eventual strikes against the Taliban supporters of 
Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan.  The United States put enormous 
pressure on Pakistan, informing Islamabad that it could either stand with America or the 
terrorists.131  If Pakistan chose the latter, it would be subject to the wrath of the United 
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States.  President Pervez Musharraf weighed his options and subsequently fell in line 
with the Washington’s demands.132  The Pakistani Army, on the other hand, did not want 
to abandon the Taliban completely.  As Saeed Shafqat explains, “The military…was not 
fully prepared to make a total break from the Taliban, whom they had supported since 
1994.”133  Still, with Musharraf on its side, the United States assumed that Islamabad 
would be able to coerce the Taliban into extraditing bin Laden.  The truth about 
Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, as explained earlier, was just the opposite.  
Delegations sent to Mullah Omar and Taliban were rebuffed.134  Diplomacy had failed.   
With the hope of a peaceful resolution dashed, the United States moved forces 
into the region for its attack on Afghanistan.  At the same time, wishing to solidify his 
standing with Washington, Musharraf began to make domestic changes towards 
Pakistan’s relationship with extremists.135  Although actions had been taken against 
militants in the past, their effects had been limited.136  This time, though, Musharraf 
aimed to make a more concerted effort.  As Hassan Abbas points out, “Leaders of 
religious political parties like Fazl ur-Rahman (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam) and Qazi 
Hussain Ahmed (Jammat-i-Islami) were arrested, and many Pakistani and Arab militants 
who were returning from their sanctuaries in Afghanistan were taken into custody.”137  
Musharraf also replaced the head of the ISI, the chief supporter of many of the extremist 
proxy organizations that the president was now attempting to disband.   
As a result of these actions, the principal-agent problem reared its head.  Militants 
once sponsored by Pakistan, now turned against the state.  Musharraf himself became the 
target of assassination plots.138  Also, jihadi groups began to carry out more attacks that 
were in line with their own internal interests, which were often maximalist in nature, as 
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opposed to the limited aims of the Pakistani state.  In October 2001, for example, 
terrorists attacked the parliament in Kashmir.  Later, in December, these same terrorists 
launched a brazen assault on the Indian parliament in New Delhi.  As a result, a tense 
military standoff developed between Pakistan and India, which nearly resulted in full 
scale war.  The United States and other members of the international community 
intervened to prevent unnecessary escalation between the two newly nuclear nations.   
Although it was later determined that LeT and JeM were responsible for the 
attacks, India held Pakistan accountable for the actions of these terrorist groups.139  
While Musharraf had taken steps to outlaw such organizations after 9/11, India was not 
satisfied and demanded Pakistan completely sever its ties with its proxies as well as hand 
over those responsible for the attacks.  Islamabad refused to turn over the accused 
terrorists to India but, under pressure from the United States, Musharraf did promise to 
take action against the extremist organizations that threatened the already tense relations 
between India and Pakistan.140  On January 12, 2002, Musharraf publicly announced to 
the Pakistani people that five militant and sectarian organizations, including JeM and LeT 
would be banned.  He also declared that “he would not allow Pakistani soil to be used as 
a launching pad for terror against India or any other country.”141  New Delhi was 
cautiously optimistic about the statements but kept its army positioned for war.  In the 
following months, while the leaders of the outlawed groups along with some of their rank 
and file members were arrested, the desired outcome was not achieved.  Pakistan’s half-
hearted attempts to deal with the problem were merely meant to appease India and the 
United States.  They did not have a lasting effect.  In May 2002, despite these actions 
taken by the Pakistani government, LeT launched more attacks, this time targeting 
families of Indian soldiers stationed in Kashmir.142  Though New Delhi was able to keep 
its military restrained despite their posture, the effects were clearly damaging to  
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Pakistan’s publicly professed stance against terrorism.  In the end, the entire 2001–2002 
standoff was resolved without open combat though high tensions would remain for some 
time between the two nations. 
In coming years, India would endure more terrorist attacks from Pakistan despite 
Islamabad’s public opposition to terrorism.  Although LeT was disbanded following the 
2001 attacks on New Delhi, it resurfaced under the auspices of a new group, Jammat-ud-
Dawa, and continued its activities.  Two major attacks in 2006 and 2008 would firmly 
establish the reputation and objectives of LeT as a terrorist power in South Asia.  On July 
11, 2006, LeT and JeM operatives detonated a series of bombs on trains and in train 
stations in Mumbai at the height of the evening rush hour, killing over 200 people and 
wounding hundreds more.143  While Pakistan immediately condemned the attacks, the 
fact that LeT and JeM were able to orchestrate such chaos showed the Islamabad had lost 
its influence with these organizations.  Nascent peace talks that had been slowly growing 
between India and Pakistan following the 2001–2002 standoff were postponed and once 
again tensions dominated the fragile relationship. 
Even more brazen than the train bombings of 2006, though, were the cold blooded 
attacks carried out by LeT terrorists in Mumbai in late November 2008.  For three days 
starting on November 26, armed gunmen paralyzed Mumbai as they deliberately 
murdered 172 people.  A few days before the attacks began, the terrorists hijacked a 
fishing vessel and thus were able to enter Mumbai via the sea rather than pass through the 
multiple security stations that they would have encountered on a land route.144  Once 
ashore the ten attackers formed four teams, each with separate targets and armed with a 
large number of weapons including assault rifles, pistols, grenades, and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs).145  The first team attacked the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, 
the central train station in Mumbai, and then moved on to the Cama and Albess Hospital,  
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while the second team stormed the Nariman House, a center for local Jewish 
community.146  The third and fourth teams attacked the Trident-Oberoi Hotel and the Taj 
Mahal Palace Hotel.147   
All of the chosen targets were “soft” targets with minimal security, which allowed 
for maximum shock value at minimal cost to the terrorists.  The largest target, Taj Mahal 
Palace Hotel, containing the famous Leopold Café, ensured that media coverage would 
be constant, guaranteeing that the attacks would reach a large audience.  Along with 
target choice, the various attacks were coordinated to occur simultaneously in order to 
sew panic and confusion among the populace and the responding Indian security and 
police forces, which they did.  By the time the attacks were over on November 28, nine of 
the terrorists were dead, and one was in custody who, when questioned, named LeT as 
the organization responsible for sponsoring the attacks. 
As in 2001 and 2006, the Pakistani government immediately and forcefully 
condemned the attacks.  Despite Indian statements to the contrary, the Pakistani 
government and the ISI denied any involvement or foreknowledge of the attacks.148  In 
an op-ed published in the New York Times, President Zardari states: 
Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, arrest, trial and punishment of 
anyone involved in these heinous attacks…Pakistan will take action 
against the non-state actors found within our territory, treating them as 
criminals, terrorists and murderers.  Not only are the terrorists not linked 
to the government of Pakistan in any way, we are their targets and we 
continue to be their victims.149 
In the following months, arrests were made, including Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed, the 
head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, though he was later released in June 2009 for lack of 
evidence.150  While the Pakistani government is publicly opposed to such attacks and has 
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taken some initiative to hunt down those responsible, the past has shown the Pakistan is 
either unable or unwilling to sustain such operations and, as a result, groups such as LeT 
can reconstitute themselves relatively easily, even without support they once enjoyed 
from the government.  As Stephen Tankel points out, “After the Mumbai attacks, 
Pakistan cracked down on Lashkar and its above-ground social welfare wing, Jammat-ud-
Dawa.  But as has historically been the case, the crackdown appears to have been aimed 
at controlling rather than destroying the group.”151 
Despite the limited follow-through on targeting LeT in the wake of Mumbai, as 
Zardari’s statement above shows, the 2008 attacks on Mumbai were not in the interests of 
the Pakistani government or the state.  In fact, Zardari as well as scholars point out that 
the target of the attacks was probably not specifically India at all but the growing India-
Pakistan peace movement, which had stalled following the 2006 Mumbai train bombings.  
As Zardari explains, “The Mumbai attacks were directed not only at India but also at 
Pakistan’s new democratic government and the peace process with India that we have 
initiated.”152  Bruce Riedel concurs, stating “One of the key targets of LeT in Mumbai, if 
not the key target, was the India-Pakistan peace process itself.”  Obviously, disrupting a 
peace process backed by the Pakistani state is not in line with the goals of the state.  
Again, this is a clear example of the principal-agent problem as it has been manifested in 
Pakistan. 
Aside from attacks in India, as the 2000s progressed, terrorist attacks also 
increased within Pakistan proper.  Ironically, rather than free itself from terrorism by 
ending its sponsorship, Pakistan invited more terrorism on itself.  As a result of 
Pakistan’s support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, militants and extremists opposed to 
Islamabad’s actions launched attacks against the symbols of the state including the 
military, police and government officials.  In the most shocking example, former Prime  
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Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning in Rawalpindi in December 
2007.  Pakistan’s “cosmetic” changes clearly did not go far enough to solve its 
burgeoning extremism problem.   
Despite the rising menace, Pakistan did not make a truly concerted effort to 
combat internal terrorism until the latter half of the decade when “Talibanization” 
emerged as an imminent threat to the state.153  Pakistan was also pressured to take action 
by the United States, which viewed the border regions of Pakistan as another front in the 
war against the Taliban insurgency.154  Data compiled from the Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking System (WITS) in Figure 1 shows the uptick in total terrorist attacks in Pakistan 
during this time period.  Figure 2 displays data from the same timeframe, but is limited to 
attacks carried out against state targets.   
 
Figure 1.   Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan: 2004–009 (total).  Data from Worldwide 
Incidents Tracking System, http://wits.nctc.gov/ (accessed February 11, 2010).155 
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Both charts clearly show the reaction to increased Pakistani activity against militants who 
pose a significant problem for the state.  Rather than accept increased state control, these 
groups have targeted the state itself.  As Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur point out, 
“Differences between the goals of the Pakistani state and the Islamist groups it helped 
nurture have severely undermined Pakistani security…”156   
 
Figure 2.   Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan: 2004–2009 (state targets).  Data from 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, http://wits.nctc.gov/ (accessed February 
11, 2010).157       
While of course not all of these attacks can be linked to organizations that were 
once sponsored by the state, the majority of militants conducting these attacks have 
directly or indirectly benefited from the support Pakistan once provided to its proxies.  
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For instance, the Taliban in Afghanistan and its factions in Pakistan, namely the Tehrik-
e-Taliban, directly challenged its one time sponsors in Islamabad when they exercised 
control over Pakistan territory in the border regions.158  While some political solutions 
were attempted, the steady escalation in terrorist attacks and militancy led to the 
introduction of Pakistani military personnel into the volatile area. 
In any case, the control that India claims Pakistan has over militants and 
extremists within Pakistan is a far from accurate.  In fact, the data from WITS shows that 
Pakistan has become a victim of terrorists and extremists once deemed important to the 
state.  Still, India has not been satisfied with Pakistan’s commitment against homegrown 
terrorists, which is understandable considering Islamabad’s history of half measures 
aimed at dealing with extremism.  As the report from a recent conference on Cold Start 
held at the Naval Postgraduate School explains, “…while we want Pakistan to be tougher 
on terrorism, about a year ago Pakistan deployed two divisions and simultaneously 
cracked down on the Red Mosque and terrorism increased almost ten-fold as a result.  If 
this is the case, Pakistan is not the problem…”159 Indian Army General Gurmeet Kanwal, 
however, “believes that Pakistan’s…fight against terrorism on its own territory is 
insufficient.”160  Ironically, though, India’s hardline view on the matter impacts 
Pakistan’s ability to fight the terrorism that India accuses it of controlling.  For example, 
any terrorist attack in India could result in an escalation in tensions that would force 
Pakistan to move troops away from unstable areas to counter any threatening posture 
assumed by India.  As a result, forces that could be used to combat the Taliban or other 
militants and help Pakistan solve its internal terrorist problem would be removed, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of further terrorism.  In the end, it remains to be seen 
if Pakistan can make a sustained concerted effort to counter terrorism, despite the risks 
the government will face with such a policy. 
The post-9/11 period has plainly shown a shift in Pakistan’s policy toward its 
once-sponsored proxies and terrorism carried out by those groups.  As a result of 
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Islamabad’s volte face under pressure from the United States and the international 
community, a definite principal-agent problem has emerged.  While Pakistan faced minor 
issues with its proxies in the past, this new era has shown that Pakistan has lost control 
over those one-time agents, which now conduct attacks according to their own interests, 
and not those of the state. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Since partition, Pakistan has had a complicated relationship with proxy fighters.  
Initially, it sponsored these organizations and used them as an extension of state policy.  
Recently though, these groups have begun to threaten their former masters, either directly 
by targeting the state, or indirectly by their maximalist agendas that affects Pakistan’s 
volatile relationship with India.  While Pakistan can clearly be held responsible for 
creating such groups, it is far from clear that such a statement can be made regarding the 
actions of these organizations today.  This principal-agent problem has come to define 
Pakistan in recent years and will likely continue to do so for some time.  It must be 
realized both by India and Pakistan that this threat to regional stability cannot be solved 
by accusatory rhetoric or posturing.  Instead, cooperation is needed to truly solve the 
problem.  
However, considering the historical animosity that dominates the relationship 
between these two countries, cooperation is hard to achieve.  Peace talks are undermined 
by a principal-agent problem intensified by enmity.  Since India sees Pakistan as being 
responsible for its homegrown terrorist groups, dialogue can easily be disrupted when 
attacks beyond the control of Islamabad occur.  Despite developments over the past 
decade, India still sees Pakistan as the one who pulls the strings of extremist and militant 
groups.  Thus, when a terrorist attack occurs, Islamabad is almost immediately blamed 
though it likely has had no role in such an attack.  Naturally, these types of accusations 
ratchet up the security tensions between the two nations.  If allowed to go too far, open 
war could be the end result, a nightmare scenario between two nuclear nations in which it 
would be difficult to control escalation.  Further exacerbating the issue is India’s Cold 
Start doctrine, created in the wake of the 2001–2002 military standoff between the two 
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nations.  Such a doctrine would allow the Indian military to move to an offensive footing, 
thereby, increasing the likelihood of war in the event further terrorist attacks occur, 
whether Islamabad is responsible or not.  In the end, Pakistan’s principal-agent issue 
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IV. PROBLEM 2: ESCALATION ON THE INDIAN 
SUBCONTINENT 
A lot of viable options (beginning from a strike on camps to a full 
conventional war) are available.  We can do it….If we go to war, jolly 
good. 161 
—Indian General Sundararajan Padmanabhan 
This chapter will explore the impacts of an operational Cold Start doctrine on the 
security and precarious stability that exists between India and Pakistan.  As the previous 
chapter has explained, Pakistan retains limited, if any, control over terrorists within its 
borders.  Cold Start, though, is aimed at coercing Islamabad to rein in these organizations 
through limited, punitive strikes while remaining below the nuclear threshold.  This 
misdirected strategic targeting is only one flaw though.  Even if this issue is resolved, 
Cold Start still poses a major challenge to future India-Pakistan relations because of its 
provocative, offensive stance and the historical legacies of escalation, misperception, and 
deception.  Two major instances, the 1971 East Pakistan War and Exercise/Operation 
Brasstacks in 1986–1987, clearly show how events can quickly spiral for each side in 
both outright armed conflict as well as military exercises.  With this in mind, the question 
remains as to whether or not Cold Start would be an operational liability for New Delhi 
should such a case arise where it would be employed.  This chapter will show that 
because of the offensive nature of the doctrine, past experience suggests an operational 
Cold Start would drastically increase the likelihood of escalation in a future conflict 
between India and Pakistan.  Thus, rather than solving India’s security concerns, Cold 
Start would exponentially increase them. 
This chapter begins with a broad discussion of escalation, both deliberate and 
inadvertent.  The following three sections will address, respectively, the 1971 India-
Pakistan War, the 1986–87 Brasstacks episode, and the 1999 Kargil War. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Since partition, the conduct of warfare on the Indian subcontinent has been a 
complicated affair.  While complex conflicts are certainly not limited to India and 
Pakistan, the colored history of antagonism between these states has created an 
environment in which minor crises have the potential to escalate to full scale war.  This 
idea is particularly troublesome today considering the fact that both India and Pakistan 
have known nuclear capabilities.  Consequently, a “limited” conflict that would have 
remained conventional in scale and escalation in the past could now result in a nuclear 
exchange that would be devastating for both Islamabad and New Delhi.  While theorists 
of nuclear weapons proliferation debate the likelihood of escalation to the nuclear level 
during an armed conflict, the fact remains that Pakistan and India have willingly put 
themselves in the position to wage full scale war on more than one occasion despite the 
presence of said weapons.  India’s new Cold Start doctrine, though limited in its aims, 
pushes the envelope even farther in this context.  India’s shift to an offensive stance 
increases the potential for escalation, intended or not, by bypassing the channels that 
could help defuse a crisis at an early, manageable stage.   
Despite the recent unveiling of the Cold Start strategy, aspects of the doctrine are 
not entirely new.  One can see parallel tactics utilized in past conflicts and crises, namely 
the 1971 War, the Brasstacks episode, and the 1999 Kargil conflict.  Rapid blitzkrieg 
operations during the 1971 War allowed the Indian military to swiftly and decisively 
overwhelm and defeat Pakistan forces in both East and West Pakistan.162  Brasstacks 
demonstrated the impact of deception and misperception on a crisis and the possibility for 
escalation to occur when the motives of an adversary are unclear.  Finally, despite the 
limited extent of Kargil, Indian officials planned to widen the conflict as necessary, 
regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons.163  In each of these cases, deception, 
misperception, and escalation played a significant role.  Cold Start’s incorporation of all 
of these ideas coupled with the fact that it is designed to bypass civil and international 
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interference makes an operational Cold Start a worrisome proposition on the 
subcontinent.  Rather than intimidate Pakistan, based on past experience such a strategy 
could invite a dangerous response from Islamabad in the event of the execution of a 
conflict based on the Cold Start model.   
Below, I address general escalation concepts and their roles in the India-Pakistan 
security dynamic. 
B. ESCALATION: DELIBERATE AND INADVERTENT 
The cases of the 1971 East Pakistan War, Operation Brasstacks, and the 1999 
Kargil conflict all demonstrate the potential escalation, both deliberate and inadvertent, 
both before and during a crisis.  In the following sections of this chapter I will examine 
those cases in greater detail.  However, a basic understanding of escalation and its effects 
are necessary to understand the implications of those crises in the overall context of Cold 
Start.   
Escalation in general refers to the notion that, during a crisis or conflict, an actor 
will reach the realization that by increasing his forces, attacks, or posturing the potential 
for victory will also increase.  Of course, in most cases, the actor will not be operating in 
a vacuum and his actions will likely worry his opponent.  As a result, the actor’s 
opponent could either attempt to counter the first move toward escalation by increasing 
his own forces in response or stand down.  Assuming escalation occurs, as Herman Khan 
puts it, “there is likely to be a ‘competition in risk-taking.’”164  Consequently, by raising 
the stakes, an escalation spiral could result that would ultimately be costly and dangerous 
for both sides.  Despite the spiraling effect, escalation will only continue as long it is 
possible to afford it, whether economically or psychologically.  Kahn explains this effect 
through the metaphors of a union strike and a game of “chicken.”  In both scenarios, one 
side eventually realizes the futility of continuing to escalate and backs down.165  This 
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type of escalation and the resulting consequences are what I call deliberate escalation.166  
While certainly destabilizing, both sides are presumably consciously upping the ante for a 
specified purpose.  In theory, deliberate escalation could be controlled.  This is not 
necessarily the case with inadvertent escalation. 
Inadvertent escalation, for the purpose of this thesis, is defined as escalation that 
results from unintended actions that occur beyond the control of a central command or 
government.167  Inadvertent escalation is inextricably linked to deliberate escalation.  
Commanders in the field, already on high alert because of the initial stages of a conflict, 
can easily overstep the mandate of their original orders causing unintentional 
consequences.  This idea is not new.  As Barry Posen explains, “There are many 
historical examples of militaries striking out on offensive actions unbeknownst to their 
civilian superiors…Even when the intensity of a crisis or conflict increases civilian 
efforts to intervene…, soldiers often interpret policymakers’ injunctions in ways that 
allow them maximum operational discretion.”168  As opposed to deliberate escalation, 
inadvertent escalation is much harder to control since autonomy and independent 
decision-making are what caused the escalation to occur in the first place.  Aside from 
military adventurism, inadvertent escalation can come from the inherent uncertainty of 
warfare or the “fog of war.”169  Under the fluid circumstances of combat, orders can be 
misconstrued, intelligence can be ill-founded or misinterpreted, and enemy intentions can 
be overestimated.  Consequently, military leaders can push for escalation whether it is 
warranted or not.  In this case, civilian leadership, already overwhelmed by conflict, 
could lose strategic control of the situation, allowing for greater increases in escalation 
beyond their initial goals.   
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In the nuclear world, both types of escalation are dangerous.  Deliberate 
escalation during a crisis could easily proceed beyond the original intentions of the main 
actors.  Inadvertent escalation, stemming from deliberate escalation, could easily result in 
an out-of-control situation, which could then develop into a nuclear war, the cost of 
which would be catastrophic for the parties involved.  Despite Kenneth Waltz’s claim 
that, “in a nuclear world any state—whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao Zedong, a Saddam 
Hussein, or a Kim Jong Il—will be deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions 
may lead to its own destruction,” there are instances where states have pursued 
aggressive actions under the shadow of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), notably 
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Soviet-Chinese confrontation along the Ussuri 
River, and the actions taken by Iraq prior to both Gulf wars.170  For India and Pakistan, 
this is especially troubling considering their past experiences of deliberate and 
inadvertent escalation, three of which will be analyzed in the following sections, and the 
future implementation of Cold Start, which as described earlier, would significantly 
increase the likelihood of both deliberate and inadvertent escalation on the subcontinent. 
C. EAST PAKISTAN AND BLITZKRIEG 
In 1971, the crisis that had been slowly building between West and East Pakistan 
over ethnolinguistic issues, government representation, and general condescension of the 
West toward the East reached a boiling point.  In March of that year, West Pakistan 
launched Operation Searchlight to disarm would be Bangladeshi separatists in the hopes 
of preventing a move for independence.171  However, the operation had just the opposite 
effect and East Pakistanis took to the streets in a combination of protest and mutiny.  In 
the course of the fighting that was to erupt in the days after Searchlight was executed, 
West Pakistani troops killed over 30,000 people in an orgy of violence.172  With the 
writing on the wall, East Pakistanis began to flee into India by the thousands where a 
resistance was formed to fight the West Pakistani incursion.   
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For its part, India became concerned with the amount of refugees streaming into 
the country.  With the influx of such a large amount of people, the majority of whom 
were Muslim, New Delhi became anxious that India would not be able to successfully 
absorb the new immigrant population into a nation already stretched for resources and 
services.  Also, there was fear that a large Muslim population taking up permanent 
residence would upset the ethnic balance in the border states, which could lead to 
separatist movements or communal hostility.173  Consequently, the Indian leadership felt 
compelled to provide assistance to the East Pakistani resistance and later to launch a 
military invasion of East Pakistan itself. 
In late November and early December, the fighting between the Indian army and 
Pakistani forces began in earnest.  As Owen Bennett Jones points out, “The first Indian 
attacks were limited to strikes on Pakistani forces followed by rapid withdrawals back 
into Indian territory.”174  However, following an attack by the Pakistani air force on 
Indian positions on December 3, Indian forces responded with strikes against Pakistani 
air bases in Karachi, Sargodha, and Islamabad and the war escalated.175  Along with 
naval operations including bombardments of key ports and a blockade of both the West 
and the East, the army executed what can be termed as blitzkrieg attacks into East 
Pakistan.176  Supported by air power, six divisions composed of mechanized armor 
supported by infantry pushed into East Pakistan on multiple fronts with unmatched speed 
and firepower as depicted in Figure 3.177 
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Figure 3.   India’s plan for its 1971 attack on East Pakistan.  Reprinted, by permission, 
from John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983), 207.    
By December 8, forces from the south reached Dacca with forces from the north arriving 
a few days later.  On December 16, after successfully crushing what remained of the 
Pakistani forces, the Indian army moved into Dacca and the next day a unilateral cease-
fire was announced by New Delhi that was echoed by Islamabad, thereby ending the 
war.178 
With the above description of the 1971 War, one can see clear implications 
regarding the foundations of Cold Start.  Like the Bangladesh War, Cold Start envisions a 
joint, multi-axis, offensive strike that can quickly and effectively grab limited amounts of 
territory and defeat the Pakistani army.   
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Figure 4.   Author’s conception of a Cold Start attack.  Map modified from Google Maps, 
http://www.google.com/mapmaker?ll=29.171349,75.849609&spn=10.980816,27.
861328&t=m&z=6 (accessed April 10, 2010).    
As Figure 4 shows in a generalized, hypothetical Cold Start operation, a multi-axis attack 
similar to the 1971 assault on East Pakistan would pose a multitude of problems for the 
Pakistani military.  Although envelopment is not possible in this case, the multiple fronts 
could cause confusion in Islamabad and raise questions among the military leadership as 
to whether such an operation would really be limited in its aims.  However, the real 
danger arises when the Indian army moves so fast, as it did in 1971, that it finds itself 
taking more and more territory than it originally planned.  While this scenario was 
different in the 1971 War, as initial plans for a “limited aims” strategy were changed in 
favor of the total defeat of all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, the fundamental 
pathologies with a rapid advance still hold.179  As Cohen explains regarding the capture 
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of Dacca, “Even though the Indian defeat of the Pakistan Army seemed to be well 
planned, in fact no orders were actually issued for the capture of the capital of East 
Pakistan, Dhaka.  It was later revealed that a senior Indian general took it upon himself to 
make the decision.”180  In this case, the Pakistanis who were planning for a limited Indian 
assault were outmatched and quickly overrun.  In the context of a Cold Start operation, a 
coordinated, rapid assault on the heartland of Pakistan such as this could easily trip “red 
lines” in Islamabad, thus, resulting in a massive retaliation that would be a greater 
catastrophe than the proxy war India was trying to deter.   
Problems with an offensive strategy can also be seen with the Pakistani 
misinterpretation of India’s goals.  According to Mearsheimer, Pakistan only massed a 
“forward defense to meet an Indian offensive, because they expected the Indian’s to 
pursue a limited arms strategy.”181  This faulty assessment surely is not lost on military 
planners in Islamabad.  Despite the professed limited goals to be pursued in a Cold Start 
attack, how can Pakistan be sure that India will not shift its aims to something more 
maximalist or, even with limited goals, how can it be sure that the Indian army will stop 
once the operation has begun and both commanders, soldiers, and the public are whipped 
to a fever pitch.   
In the end, with a force and strategy remarkably similar to what was used in 1971, 
namely division strength units with battalion support and coordinated air cover executing 
multi axis, lightning-type strikes, Cold Start poses a significant challenge for Pakistani 
planners.182  No doubt, India views this as the most effective way of deterring proxy 
assaults under the shadow of nuclear weapons but from the Pakistani point of view, this 
puts Pakistan in an untenable situation to where the very existence of the Pakistani state 
may be threatened.  Thus, in all likelihood, Pakistan will rely more on asymmetric tactics 
rather than less, build up a conventional force to counter that of India, and possibly lower 
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its nuclear threshold to prevent any Indian incursion that could destroy the state, thus 
destabilizing the already unstable subcontinent.183 
D. MISPERCEPTION AND BRASSTACKS 
From mid-1986 through early 1987, the Indian military executed a series of 
exercises known as Brasstacks.  Beginning in May-June 1986, the exercises, four in total, 
progressively increasing in complexity, realism, and jointness, were designed to employ 
the bulk of India’s military on a coordinated scale not before witnessed in South Asia.184  
Taking place in a politically charged atmosphere, which was causing unease in both 
Islamabad and New Delhi, Brasstacks set off a chain of events that would lead the 
subcontinent to the brink of war.  While the first three exercises were important, their 
relevance for this paper is limited to the fact that they set the stage for the fourth exercise, 
Brasstacks IV.  It was this fourth exercise, renamed Operation Trident, when there was 
fear that Pakistan may in fact launch an offensive to counter what it saw as an imminent 
Indian strike that created the majority of tensions in this whole episode.185 
With the execution of Brasstacks IV, relations between India and Pakistan, 
already strained, became even more unstable.  In response to Indian movements in 
previous months, Pakistan executed its own winter exercises, dubbed Saf-e-Shikan, and 
later Sldegehammer.186  Despite reassurances from the Indian government that the 
exercises were benign and that New Delhi had no offensive designs on Pakistan, 
Islamabad was not willing to gamble its existence on reassurances when India’s military 
was putting strike capable forces in positions that could devastate the Pakistani state.  
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Even more worrisome from the Pakistani side, for over forty days, beginning on 
December 8, the hotline between the director generals of military operations in Pakistan 
and India (DGMOs) inexplicably was not used.187  An already unstable situation became 
even more volatile.  In mid-January, the Pakistani military moved its own forces into 
positions, which to the Indian military brass, signaled its intent to launch a pincer 
movement into Indian territory near Amritsar in support of Sikh separatists.188  The 
Indian military responded in kind and moved its own forces to counter the Pakistani 
threat.  As the prospects for war became imminent, both sides decided to open a dialogue 
in order to prevent further escalation.  Through successive diplomatic talks, the crisis was 
resolved by mid-February 1987.  As a side note, in the near the end of the crisis, 
unconfirmed information came to the forefront from Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadir 
(A.Q.) Kahn that Pakistan was in possession of a nuclear bomb and prepared to use it in 
defense of the Pakistani state.189  Although this revelation had little impact on the crisis, 
coming when it did, it did add a new dimension to the tensions that remained between 
Pakistan and India.    
Like the East Pakistan War of 1971, one can see the parallels between the Cold 
Start doctrine and Brasstacks.  For Cold Start, aside from its main offensive features, one 
of the most important elements for its success is misperception.  The main reason for the 
multi-axis deployment/attack strategy is to confuse and paralyze Pakistani decision 
making abilities so as to slow Pakistani response, prevent the concentration of Pakistani 
forces, and inhibit Pakistan’s effective use of its nuclear arsenal against a multi-front, 
unpredictable Indian offensive.190  By achieving surprise through the creation of 
misperception, India would be more likely to rapidly and convincingly achieve its 
military and political aims.  However, this intentional deception could also send signals 
the Indian military did not intend.  In the case of Brasstacks, Indian leaders told their 
counterparts in Pakistan that the exercises were routine and of a benign nature even 
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though, from the Pakistani perspective, actions taken by the Indian military seemed to tell 
another story.  The Pakistanis responded in kind with their own exercise, which created 
dangerous escalation.  With Cold Start, this pathology also holds.  Despite what the 
Indians may state are their limited objectives, actions could prove otherwise as described 
in the above section regarding the 1971 War. 
Also, although unacknowledged publicly, another important aspect of Cold Start 
is the limitation of civilian leadership intervention in military operations.  However, the 
example of Brasstacks does not bode well for this proposition.  As described in 
Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, 
“Inadequate communications between the Prime Minister…and his Minister of State for 
Defense, and the Service Chiefs appears to have developed as the crisis unfolded.”191  
According to some, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) “was deliberately kept 
uninformed about key elements of Brasstacks because ‘they could not be trusted to keep a 
secret.’”192  Also, the Ministry of Defense was “kept on the peripheries.”193  Thus, while 
certainly not all of the civilian leadership was kept out of the loop, those who were 
involved with the crisis did not have a full range of opinions available with which to 
judge their actions. 
As seen with Brasstacks, misperception can lead toward a rapid escalation of 
brinkmanship that is hard to defuse.  According to Brasstacks and Beyond: 
Many lessons can be learned from Brasstacks and consequent 
developments.  Perhaps the most important is to realize that the gap 
between the perception of the two sides as to the intentions and actual 
moves of the other reached very dangerous levels.  Both seem to have 
immediately resorted to adverse interpretations of each other’s 
intentions…Since the two countries nearly came to blows because of this 
misreading of intentions, the…perception is that it is imperative that India 
and Pakistan should not only reduce their reliance on the use of force…but 
must evolve some type of institutional framework to check the tendency to 
drift towards catastrophic confrontation.194 
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Despite these lessons, with Cold Start, India intends to use deception and the creation of 
misperception to its advantage operationally.  In sum, rather than discouraging proxy 
attacks, Cold Start may in fact force Pakistan to reposition its own forces and utilize more 
non-state actors in order to counter Indian developments of which their intentions, from 
the Pakistani perspective, cannot credibly be attained. 
E. KARGIL AND THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION 
In 1999, barely a year after both India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices, the two 
states plunged into conflict in a sector of the Kashmiri LoC called Kargil.195  The main 
cause of the crisis was the deliberate incursion of Pakistani regular forces, as well as 
Kashmiri insurgents across the LoC into Indian Kashmir at Kargil in attempt to return the 
issue of Kashmir to the world’s attention.  Indian intelligence failed to anticipate such a 
movement because of the formidable terrain and altitude of the area.196  All of this 
occurred less than three months after Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his 
Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, met in Lahore to establish a new era of cooperation 
and stability on the subcontinent.197 
The conflict escalated to war when Indian forces responded to the Pakistani 
incursion and attempted to remove the Pakistani military units from their entrenched 
positions above the Srinagar-Leh Highway.198  Initially, the Indians could not eject the 
Pakistanis because of bungled leadership, poor logistics, and the lack of experience in the 
terrain.  As Ganguly points out:  
The initial Indian reaction was clumsy due to a lack of good information 
about the intruders’ strength, disposition, and capabilities…because of the 
lack of ground cover and the intruders’ command of the heights, the 
advancing Indian troops became easy targets for Pakistani snipers and 
gunners.  After taking substantial casualties, the Indians realized that they  
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would need considerably greater firepower to dislodge the Pakistani 
intruders…Logistical, organizational and topographic limitations 
significantly hobbled Indian military operations.199 
However, once air power was authorized, the Indians were able to utilize that advantage 
coupled with artillery support and an overall better operational plan to eventually drive 
the Pakistani troops from their positions.   
With the utilization of greater force, the possibility for escalation dramatically 
increased.  Although Pakistan did not respond in kind to Indian conventional attacks, 
Islamabad did authorize an increase in the alert status of its nuclear arsenal and hinted at 
the possible use of such weapons.200  As Sagan explains, “Pakistani political 
authorities…made nuclear threats during the crisis, suggesting that nuclear weapons 
would be used precisely under…conditions” of Indian escalation.201   On the Indian side, 
plans were made to deliberately escalate the conflict if its war aims were not met.  
Beyond simply increasing firepower available to Indian forces in Kargil and changing its 
operational tactics to allow its air force to intervene, New Delhi entertained the 
possibility of widening the war beyond Kashmir.  Mechanized forces were moved into 
Rajasthan to facilitate a counterattack should the operations in Kargil fail to eject 
Pakistani forces, a move that concerned Islamabad.202  According to Kapur, “Pakistani 
leaders…took the possibility of Indian…escalation seriously.  [Pakistani Prime Minister 
Nawaz] Sharif, for example, publicly worried during the…crisis that India might not 
merely undertake a limited cross-LoC attack but ‘was getting ready to launch a full-scale 
military operation against Pakistan.’”203  In the end, though, outside intervention, namely 
that of the United States, helped bring about a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.204  
While nuclear weapons may have given the leaders in Islamabad and New Delhi pause 
regarding their courses of action, they did not prevent escalatory posturing by both sides.  
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According to Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “It would appear that India’s decision to not 
escalate the crisis had more to do with the success of international pressure on Pakistan 
that with…nuclear threat[s].”205 
The overall outcome of Kargil conflict, as well as the impact of the actions taken 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, all have three major implications for a 
conflict fought according to the Cold Start doctrine.  First, while the military in Pakistan 
blamed the political leadership in Islamabad for waffling under international pressure and 
prematurely withdrawing Pakistani forces from combat, a so-called “stab in the back,” 
New Delhi, on the other hand, saw its conduct of the war and the threats of escalation as 
the causal factors for Pakistan’s retreat.206  Thus, rather than demonstrating the fallacy of 
limited war under the nuclear umbrella, Kargil proved to India just the opposite: such a 
war could be fought and it could even be escalated if the circumstances required it.  For 
the Indian Army, Cold Start would help further India’s capabilities to fight and win such 
a war, regardless of the potential for escalation, which India saw not as a detriment but 
instead as a useful tool to intimidate Pakistan.  Second, the intervention of the 
international community that proved to be instrumental in ending the Kargil conflict and, 
two years later, in the reduction of tensions during the military standoff following the 
December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament is no longer seen as beneficial 
to Indian strategic aims.  Consequently, Cold Start is precisely designed to undercut just 
such outside interference.  As described earlier, by launching an attack against Pakistan 
within seventy-two to ninety six hours after mobilization notification, the Indian military 
would afford the international community little, if any, opportunity to play a role in a 
Cold Start executed conflict.   
Finally, the decision made by Islamabad to increase its alert status on its nuclear 
arsenal shows just how seriously Pakistan took the Indian threat.  In a Cold Start 
scenario, the threat posed by the Indian military would be even more severe for Pakistan.  
As explained in the section on the 1971 War, it is not beyond reason for Pakistan to think 
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that a limited war could expand into a wider conflict with larger aims assumed by forces 
in the field or by the leadership in New Delhi.  While India claims to be aware of so-
called Pakistan nuclear “red lines,” it is unclear how Pakistan would view Indian 
operations in reference to those tripwires.  Those red lines, as described by Lieutenant 
General Khalid Kidwai of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division, are as follows: “India 
attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of 
Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it 
economically; or India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilization or creates 
large-scale internal subversion in the country.”207  Clearly, when facing the uncertainty, 
rapidity, and aggressiveness of a Cold Start attack, Pakistan could determine that these 
red lines were in imminent danger of being breached and launch its nuclear weapons, 
which would most likely be in a high state of readiness as evidenced by Kargil and the 
2001/2002 military standoff.  In the end, the Kargil War shows that escalation in the face 
of nuclear weapons is not necessarily taboo.  Building on this conflict, Cold Start would, 
in fact make escalation, more likely and thus more dangerous. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Cold Start evolved out of the inability of the Indian military to mobilize rapidly in 
response to perceived Pakistani aggression.  By shifting its strategic posture from 
defensive to offensive, by reorganizing its forces from large corps to more agile 
divisions, and by emphasizing speed, maneuverability and deception, the Indian military 
hopes that it has at last found a way to effectively respond to any Pakistani-based 
adventurism.  However, as shown above, the key aspects of Cold Start are not wholly 
new and can be found in past crisis between the two subcontinent states.  Speed and an 
overwhelming offensive force in 1971 created the opportunity for India to split Pakistan 
in two.  In fact, movement occurred so quickly that the Indian army made large gains it 
had not fully anticipated.  Pakistan was expecting limited aims from India and thus the  
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defense employed was ineffective.208  Therefore, even with the limited incursion rhetoric 
surrounding Cold Start, Islamabad cannot rely on statements when the past has shown 
another precedent. 
Deception, misperception, and miscommunication all combined to create an 
escalating crisis in late 1986 and early 1987.  While India claimed its Brasstacks 
exercises were of a benign nature, Pakistan was not confident in those statements.  
Instead, it looked at the posture of Indian forces and concluded it had to respond with its 
own exercises and subsequent military deployments.209  Consequently, military exercises 
spiraled into a crisis that nearly resulted in armed conflict.  Again, the past shows that one 
of the key components of Cold Start, deception and misperception, unintended or 
otherwise, can lead to undesired outcomes.  With the history of animosity between the 
two countries, this lack of trust is a flaw in the deterrence capability of Cold Start.  
Lastly, Kargil 1999 demonstrates how escalation under the nuclear umbrella is not only 
possible but was anticipated and planned for by both sides, raising the specter of a similar 
situation in a future Cold Start operation.  Under Cold Start, though, the international 
community, the main impediment to uncontrolled escalation in this case, would be unable 
to intervene quickly and effectively.  In the end, as stated earlier, with the uncertainty of 
India’s intentions coupled with the potential for unmitigated escalation, an already uneasy 
Pakistan could become emboldened to increase its conventional forces and lower its 
nuclear threshold in anticipation of any move by India.  Thus, on the whole, goals India is 
hoping to achieve through Cold Start may actually be undermined by the very 
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V. PROBLEM 3: THE LEGACIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS AND INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY 
Cold Start Doctrine moves from the erstwhile defensive mindset the Indian 
Army has maintained since independence, shifting to the offensive and 
requiring significant adjustments in leadership and…philosophy, which is 
easier said than done. 210 
—Pakistani Air Commodore Tariq M. Ashraf 
While the previous two chapters addressed the Pakistani principal-agent problem 
and escalation issues, this chapter will address the domestic, institutional hurdles to 
implementing Cold Start.  Specifically, this chapter will focus on two major concerns, the 
first of which is the complex civil-military relationship that exists between New Delhi 
and the military.  While this issue is not of the magnitude that affects Pakistan, the fact 
that the Indian civilian leadership has a history of isolating the military from the decision 
making process and curtailing its independence is relevant to the discussion of a strategy 
such as Cold Start.  This type of strategy, as will be shown, requires tight civil-military 
cooperation for it to be effective and yet measured in its execution.  The second concern 
involves the Indian military’s historical inter-service rivalries that could hinder the 
effective execution of a Cold Start operation, an operation that requires robust, joint 
coordination to achieve its goals.  While other factors such as infrastructure issues as well 
as technology and equipment shortcomings are important, those are tangible things that 
can be solved with appropriate planning, spending, and procurement.  The questions 
concerning civil-military relations and joint service interoperability, however, go to the 
heart of India’s offensive doctrine for limited war.  These hurdles may prove to be too 
great to overcome.   
This chapter will begin with an historical overview of the evolution of Indian 
military strategy and defense policy.  Following that discussion, civil-military relations 
will be examined in the context of Cold Start.  Finally, inter-service rivalries will be 
addressed.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
India emerged from the rule of the British Empire as a polyglot, multicultural 
nation-state.  Unlike its neighbor, Pakistan, India was able to reap the lingering benefits 
of British rule, namely industry and, more importantly, robust institutions of democratic 
government.  While Pakistan languished under the unequal distribution of the spoils of 
partition and faced turmoil following the death of its founding father, Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, not long after independence, India established a relatively stable democratic 
government headed by its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.  Nehru’s primary goals 
during his years in power were to increase India’s economic growth and industrial 
capability while maintaining a “nonalignment” policy toward the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the nascent years of the Cold War.  Nehru’s governance in the first 
decade and a half of independence would establish the superiority of civilian rule in 
India.  While Pakistan would face alternating military and civilian rule and subsequent 
instability, India’s government would remain stable and civilian run at the expense of 
military power.  Thus, the Indian military, despite it prominence during the years of the 
British Raj, was relegated to subservience in the independence era.  Rather than play a 
role in formulating policy, the military was isolated.  Also, instead of creating a unified 
command structure that could potentially acquire too much power and possibly threaten 
civilian rule, the separate armed services were given an equal footing amongst 
themselves, enabling competition and infighting for resources and influence, establishing 
the notion of rivalry that continues to this day.  Thus, by eliminating the specter of 
military rule in its early years, India civilian government established the opposite 
precedent, one of a military hamstrung by New Delhi and faced with inter-service 
competition.  
These issues, complex civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry, have 
major implications for the implementation of the Cold Start doctrine.  India’s new limited 
war doctrine, a shift from a decades-long emphasis on defense to one of offense, requires 
a close civil-military relationship based on trust and military independence.  The strategy 
also requires joint, integrated forces to fulfill its goals of rapid, punitive strikes against  
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the Pakistani military.  The development of these institutional relationships remains 
inadequate, however.  As such, Cold Start’s potential for success is limited in the current 
domestic environment.   
In the following section, the historical development of Indian defense doctrine 
and strategy is examined.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
When India achieved independence from the British Empire in August 1947, it 
faced many challenges, not the least of which was security and defense.  While 
institutions of the state that had been established by the British remained, fundamental 
issues of general policy, economics, and foreign relations, among others, were 
unresolved.  The process of creating a viable state was key to the success of 
independence.  Partition naturally added to the complexity of the situation, especially 
when it came to the issue of security and defense.  Although some effort was made to 
establish a common defense force for both India and Pakistan prior to partition and in the 
immediate years following the division, the bloody aftermath of partition and developing 
antagonism between the two states prevented such an arrangement.211  Instead, the 
regionally integrated military, which had existed in British India, was split into two 
forces that would become the Indian and Pakistani armies.  The resulting division of 
assets, equipment, and personnel between India and Pakistan yielded a force ratio of 2 to 
1 in favor of the Indians.212  Superiority in numbers, however, did not guarantee security 
for India.  As events later in 1947 would show, Pakistan was more than willing to commit 
its smaller forces to a cause it deemed of fundamental importance to its identity as a state.  
This issue, the unresolved state of the territory of Kashmir, would come to define the 
India-Pakistan relationship in subsequent years with events surrounding the territory 
eventually precipitating two more wars.   
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As for the rest of the region, India was at ease with its immediate neighbors, 
signing friendship treaties with Bhutan, Nepal, and Burma.213  China, for the leadership 
in New Delhi, posed little military threat because of the towering Himalayas, which 
offered a natural barrier from the Chinese. 214  Globally, the nascent Cold War brewing 
between the Soviet Union and the United States affected India’s outlook beyond South 
Asia.  
Because of the perceived lack of potential security issues on the horizon, the new 
leadership of India, primarily Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, pursued the peaceful 
development of the state economically, industrially, and socially, rather than formulate a 
strategic security policy or spend on military defense.  As Stephen Cohen points out: 
Nehru…focused most of India’s postwar energies on building state power, 
but not state military power.  He took seriously his own statements about 
the priority of internal economic development, so defense budgets 
remained stagnant… Nehru and his confidants saw defense spending as 
detrimental to both economic growth and civilian dominance… Indian 
defense planning was virtually nonexistent, an afterthought…215  
Nehru’s poor opinion of the military in general also colored his view on security matters.  
The prime minister and his adviser’s did not want to push the military beyond its limited 
capabilities and thus pursued minimal security and defense goals.216  Also, Nehru’s own 
reservations regarding the use of force, similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi, resulted in a 
stunted military policy.217    
However, events such as the 1947 Kashmir War and growing tensions with China 
eventually forced Nehru and his administration to formulate a general defense policy.  
Because of Nehru’s desire for “nonalignment” with the superpowers during this period, 
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emphasis was placed on military independence and self-sufficiency.218  Various reports 
and recommendations produced by advisors to Nehru attempted to show how India could 
maintain this independence and also meet all of its defense needs at a low cost.219  As a 
result of these factors, ideas, and inputs, and the importance placed on political and 
economic development as well as the limited capabilities of the Indian armed forces, 
logically military policy became one based primarily on defense.220  Concern was 
focused on the northwest and the ability to defend against further incursions Pakistan 
might make in Kashmir.  To the northeast, China, though emerging as a potential threat, 
was still seen as a diplomatic challenge rather than a military problem.221 
All of this would change in October 1962 when the Indian military along the 
disputed northeastern boundary with China was overrun by Chinese military units.  Both 
sides had antagonized each other during the period preceding China’s actions but for 
Nehru and his administration in New Delhi, the minor incidents that occurred did not 
amount to much and Nehru felt any standoff could be resolved diplomatically.  The prime 
minister severely underestimated the Chinese position, however.222  As a result, China’s 
military response caught Nehru and the Indian military off guard and only China’s 
unilateral decision to cease fighting prevented an invasion of the subcontinent.223  This 
disaster not only revealed the inadequacies of military doctrine, training, and leadership, 
but it also showed the weakness of Nehru’s reliance on diplomacy as a preferred course 
of action in a volatile situation.   
When the smoke cleared, New Delhi realized that a purely defensive national 
military strategy focused solely on Pakistan was not practical considering the dual threat 
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it now faced.  Consequently a new strategy was adopted that would enable the military to 
respond to a two-front crisis and unlike the period immediately following independence, 
military and defense spending was no longer ignored.  This shift was not entirely in 
opposition to Nehru’s emphasis on economic development.  In fact, according to Cohen, 
“leading Indian strategists argued not only that defense spending was necessary for 
military security, but that it made a positive contribution to economic development.”224  
India also moved toward acquisition of weapons and materiel from both superpowers to 
sustain its buildup, a shift from the push for self-sufficiency in the previous decade.225   
While New Delhi sought to correct its defense deficiencies vis-à-vis China, its 
push for greater security capabilities also worried Islamabad, which saw the Indian 
buildup as a threat to its own security.226  In 1965, sensing weakness in the wake of 
Nehru’s death and yet fearing a widening military gap with India, Pakistan decided to 
act.227  Proxy and regular forces from Pakistan were sent into Kashmir in the hopes of 
settling the recurring issue.  The Indian response was swift and widespread, 
encompassing a larger front than just the territory in dispute, which reflected India’s aim 
to make such a conflict unreasonably costly for Pakistan.228  Despite the designs of both 
sides, neither military performed particularly well.  In the end, a standoff emerged 
between the two states, with the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union 
preventing the potential for further escalation.229  A subsequent ceasefire was reached, 
ending the war.  Although India could be considered the victor in this war, current 
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posture against Pakistan was based on ‘matching capabilities,’ but since 1965 India’s 
policy has been to maintain ‘sufficient deterrence’ or a ‘slight edge’ in its force 
deployments vis-à-vis Pakistan.”230    
Following the 1965 War, the new Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, moved to 
bolster India’s military status on the subcontinent.  Whereas Prime Minister Nehru had 
advanced the idea of “nonalignment” with the superpowers as a basis for defense policy, 
Mrs. Gandhi focused her efforts more on the regional level.231  Still, during this period, 
India maintained its strategy to fight two simultaneous wars.  However, unstable relations 
with the superpowers following the 1965 War caused uncertainty regarding weapons 
procurement and the ability to credibly execute a two-war strategy.  By the end of the 
1960s, though, India strengthened its alliance with the Soviet Union, a move that would 
enable India to pursue its defense objectives with an adequately equipped military but 
would also come to harm India when Soviet policy became contrary to that of India.232   
The 1971 War between West and East Pakistan created an opportunity for India to 
increase its power in the region.  Though a civil war, India justified its intervention 
because of the refugee crisis created by the fighting.  According to Sumit Ganguly:  
By mid-May [1971] the number of refugees in India had grown to an 
estimated ten million.  The presence of refugees in West Bengal and in 
other northeastern Indian states was both an economic and a political onus 
for the government in New Delhi.  India, a poor country, already 
sandbagged with a turgid population, could not afford to permanently 
absorb another ten million disadvantaged individuals.233  
Over an eight-month period, India built up its forces and in December executed a 
coordinated attack against West Pakistan forces in both East and West Pakistan.  John J. 
Mearsheimer rightly called the assault on East Pakistan a blitzkrieg-type operation.234  In 
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short order, the Indian military defeated Pakistani forces.  Through these actions, India 
became firmly entrenched as the dominant power in South Asia. 
As a result of the victory in the 1971 War, Mrs. Gandhi was able to introduce a 
new doctrine for the region that became known as the Indira Doctrine.  Similar to the 
American Monroe Doctrine, the Indira Doctrine held the basic premise that South Asia 
was India’s backyard and no undue influence from outside powers would be allowed in 
the region without India’s approval.235  India’s entry onto the nuclear stage in 1974 with 
its detonation of a “peaceful nuclear explosion” further added to its regional 
supremacy.236  Despite these developments, India’s unchecked dominance was not long 
lived.  Pakistan, though demonstrably weakened by its defeat in 1971, was rapidly 
rebuilding its military to counter India’s power.  India also found itself increasingly 
isolated from the international community.  The United States pressured India to accept 
the terms of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act even though no such demands were 
made on Pakistan, which Indian believed was pursuing its own nuclear program.237  
Actions taken by its partners in Moscow, especially USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 
late 1979, embarrassed India politically.238  Doubts were also raised regarding the overall 
effectiveness of Soviet weapons systems that had been purchased by India due to their 
poor performance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.239 
Because of these increased challenges, India once again had to rethink its military 
and overall defense strategies.  During the 1980s, with suspicions in India growing about 
Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon and the growing Sikh insurgency in the Punjab 
that was thought to be backed by Pakistan, the Indian military embarked on a new 
strategy of conventional deterrence that would utilize its superiority in manpower and 
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mechanized equipment.240  Known as the Sundarji Doctrine, the strategy was put into 
practice with the execution of Exercise Brasstacks in 1986-87.241  Although designed to 
test the efficacy of the Sundarji Doctrine, the amount of military forces massed by India, 
coupled with their activity and maneuvers, and the subsequent Pakistani response, caused 
events to quickly escalate, as both sides misconstrued each others’ intentions.242  
Pakistan saw the exercise as the prelude to an Indian invasion while India maintained it 
had no such designs.243  In the end, open combat between Indian and Pakistan was 
averted through diplomatic channels, but the potential for inadvertent escalation was clear 
for both sides. 
The idea of the Sundarji Doctrine would continue to serve as the basis for Indian 
military strategy for the next decade and a half.  With manpower and technological 
superiority, New Delhi felt its military was up to the task of countering any Pakistani 
threat that India would face.  The burgeoning Kashmir insurgency would undermine that 
confidence.  In April 1990, Pakistan and India came close to war as a result of 
accusations by both sides concerning their respective roles in the crisis in the disputed 
region.244  War was avoided but the tensions remained.  During the remainder of the 
decade, Pakistani-sponsored proxies in Kashmir emerged as a new enemy that would 
eventually threaten India itself.  These groups, former mujahedeen who had successfully 
defeated a superpower in the Soviet Union, were now directed to aid in the struggle over 
Kashmir.  By the end of the 1990s, the insurgency in the disputed region had developed 
into a costly affair for the Indians financially and militarily, tying down a significant 
portion of Indian military and security forces in Kashmir. 
Strategy on the subcontinent took another twist in May 1998 when both India and 
Pakistan tested nuclear devices, announcing the addition of overt nuclear capabilities to 
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the already complex rivalry between the two states.245  Although some believed, and still 
do, that nuclear weapons would stabilize relations between India and Pakistan, the fact 
remains that the region remains volatile and unstable.  In 1999, barely a year after the 
nuclear tests, India and Pakistan faced off in open combat over the small mountain town 
of Kargil in Kashmir.  The conflict began when Indian forces discovered that Pakistani 
forces had crossed the LoC and entrenched themselves in positions high in the slopes 
above Kargil.246  The Indians naturally responded but were initially hampered by 
inadequate intelligence, equipment, and training.  Eventually, the Indians prevailed and 
drove the Pakistani forces from their positions.   
While the details are important, this discussion is more concerned with the overall 
ability of Pakistan and India to wage a limited war under the shadow of nuclear weapons.  
In this instance, both sides understood the high stakes of the game that was being played 
and avoided escalation though both side contemplated it.247  Despite the avoidance of 
escalation in Kargil, the question remains as to whether restraint can be guaranteed in all 
forms of conflict.  In the nuclear era, this question is of utmost importance. 
In sum, since independence, Indian defense and military strategy has followed a 
complicated path to its present condition.  While initially neglected, strategy evolved into 
a defensive mindset directed toward a single enemy.  Events later forced strategy and 
policy to deal with a two front war.  Although India gained dominance on the 
subcontinent in 1972, it eventually faced a resurgent Pakistan.  As a result of 
technological improvements, India pursued a large scale mechanized solution to meet its 
security needs, a strategy it maintained until the early 2000s.  The advent of nuclear 
weapons and its continued compellence problem under the umbrella of those weapons led 
India to contemplate the possibility of fighting a limited war with controlled escalation.  
Consequently, Cold Start was developed to give India leverage in this environment.  As 
shown above, though, the history of Indian defense strategy and doctrine indicates a 
defensive mindset within both the Indian military and government, just the opposite 
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required by Cold Start.  A radical change, then, to an offensive mindset would require a 
shift not only in force disposition but also in longstanding government and military 
notions of independence, jointness, and cooperation.  The following sections will explore 
two of these core issues, the civil-military divide and inter-service rivalry dimensions of 
the defense establishment. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
As explained earlier, at partition, India inherited a military that had been trained 
by the British Empire.  As a result, the armed forces, the Indian Army in particular, was a 
professional force, cognizant of its role in a civilian-led society.248  However, the 
government of the new nation-state did not fully trust the military.  Unlike revolutionary 
armies such as the communist army in China, which later became the People’s Liberation 
Army, the new Indian military was not an extension of the anti-colonialist movement. To 
Nehru and other nationalist leaders, the military was a holdover of the British Raj.249  
They did not forget that the army was often used to quell nationalist uprisings during the 
decades leading up to independence.  As Cohen points out, “the limited contact of 
politicians with the military before 1947 reinforced their suspicion of the motives and 
loyalties of those who had voluntarily served under the British.”250  The 1958 military 
coup in Pakistan put Nehru further on guard against the development of excessive 
military power and influence.251 
To ensure that the armed services of the new Indian republic were firmly under 
civilian control, the government took extraordinary measures to reduce the prestige and 
influence of the military.  First, the position of the Commander-in-Chief was reduced in 
stature during the years immediately before and following independence, and in 1955 the 
                                                 
248 Kotera M. Bhimaya, “Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan” 
(Ph.D. diss., RAND Graduate School, 1997), 69. 
249 Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 128. 
250 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971), 172.  
251 Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 129. 
 84
position was abolished all together.252  Next, the heads of the Indian Air Force and Navy 
were elevated to the same level as that of the Army despite the smaller size of these two 
services.  In this case, the government did not want one branch of the military dominating 
the others and thereby having undue influence.  Also, the military was made subordinate 
to a new Defense Minister.253  Obviously this move was a logical extension of civilian 
control and organization over the armed forces.  Still, the military was unfamiliar with 
this position in the hierarchy.  According to Venna Kukreja, “during British times, the 
ranking army officers had direct access to the executive.”254  Now though, the military 
brass had to send their ideas and recommendation through civilians, the Defense 
Secretary and Defense Minister, before they would reach top government leadership.  As 
a result, the military became isolated from the civilian government in New Delhi and was 
often kept out of the decision-making process. 
Also complicating matters in the years following independence, as stated earlier, 
was the general neglect of defense policy and military strategy.  Prime Minister Nehru 
and the other leaders of the government were more concerned with economic 
development and growth than creating and formalizing military doctrine.  Because of this 
neglect, the post of Minister of Defense was not a highly regarded position in New Delhi 
and the ministry as a whole had limited power.  As Lorne Kavic explains:  
The appointment in Defence was not politically attractive because the 
appointee ‘has to get into something that he knows nothing 
about…and…he always faces criticism if anything goes wrong with 
nothing to compensate for it…It [the Defense Ministry] remains a 
neglected ministry, run mainly by the civilian secretariat staff.  The 
minister in such cases remains a nonentity influenced by party 
politics…His decisions are due more to political and financial 
considerations than to a mature understanding of military problems.  He 
cannot therefore be convincing enough or force an issue amongst his 
colleagues.’255 
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In the end, the lack of influence of the Defense Minister, combined with the new 
subservient role of the military, would have major consequences for the security and 
defense of India as would be seen during the 1962 confrontation with the People’s 
Republic of China. 
In 1962, as described earlier, the Indian and Chinese military faced off over 
territorial and boundary disputes.  Fighting lasted only one month but by the end of it, the 
Indian Army had suffered a humiliating defeat, with the Chinese ending hostilities 
unilaterally.  This military disaster was a result of the isolation of the military and the 
lack of understanding in New Delhi about the capabilities of the military.  The civilian 
leadership, while trying to negotiate with the Chinese, took control of military strategy 
and tactics despite their lack of knowledge of these matters.  As Cohen points out, 
“Nehru directly supervised the placement of individual brigades, companies, and even 
platoons, as the Chinese and Indian forces engaged in mutual encirclement of isolated 
outposts.  Neither [Defense Minister] Menon nor Nehru had any earlier military 
experience, and the Indian Army still harbors an extraordinary amount of bitterness at 
their use of troops as essentially political pawns.”256  Clearly, the dominance of the 
civilian leadership hampered the military in this case.     
In subsequent wars, the military was given somewhat greater autonomy but still 
had limited input on the decision-making process prior to the commencement of combat.  
The Indian Army’s intervention in Sri Lanka during the 1980s is a good example of the 
military being used as a political pawn in regional conflict at the same time being kept 
out of the information loop.  According to Cohen, the military had been assured “an easy 
victory” in Sri Lanka although it was kept in the dark regarding the role that Indian 
intelligence services had in training the enemy the army would come to face.257  The 
Indian Army was angered over what it saw as a misuse of military power by civilian 
agencies, which had helped create the problem in the first place. 
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The events of 2001–2002 show the persistence of civil-military distrust and its 
impact on the employment of military force.  Starting off, the civilian government did not 
provide the military with clear objectives as to desired end state.258  Slow mobilization 
also created problems concerning this debate.  First, as described earlier, it allowed New 
Delhi to rethink its course of action, eventually deciding to delay an attack on Pakistan.  
Even after further provocation in May 2002 when terrorists attacked an army 
encampment, the military was held back.259  Second, slow mobilization also limited the 
options available to the civilian government.  Had the army mobilized quickly, the 
civilian government may have entertained the idea of limited strikes into Pakistan.  
However, that course of action was not open to New Delhi. 
The specter of continued civil-military problems has large ramifications for the 
Cold Start doctrine.  First, Cold Start requires a relatively independent, well informed 
military force coupled with a trusting civilian government.  According to Mearsheimer, 
this kind of blitzkrieg-type operation “demands a flexible command structure peopled 
from top to bottom with soldiers capable of exercising initiative in combat 
situations…Boldness is essential, even when information is incomplete, so that the 
offensive can maintain the initiative.”260  However, past cases show that the military has 
little input when it comes to defense policy and civilian dominance and mistrust has 
stifled creative thinking.  As Patel points out: 
Independent India fights its wars with very close political oversight and 
control.  A doctrine that calls for rapid response and initiation of intense 
combat operations raises the possibility that political controls may become 
less effective, and that the combat commanders would have far greater 
latitude for independent initiative than would be deemed acceptable.  Cold 
Start would be a non-starter without civilian institutions that can develop 
the political framework and objectives to support a rapid response 
doctrine, and without a politico-military command structure that can 
withstand the increased decision making tempo generated by the intense 
combat operations.261 
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Without boldness, dynamic campaigns such as Cold Start cannot be launched 
successfully.  This continuing lack of proper civil-military cooperation is shown with the 
fact that Cold Start was unveiled by the army publicly to encourage open debate.262  
Before this time, the civilian leadership alone decided the merit of a strategy.      
Next, clear objectives need to be established at the start of a limited war 
campaign, yet as was seen in Operation Parakram, poor civil-military relations resulted in 
the execution of an operation that “lacked clear objectives and terminated with 
inconclusive results.”263  Instead of launching an invasion for which it mobilized, the 
Indian Army found itself in a ten-month standoff that resulted in minimal gains for the 
security of India as a whole.  Finally, a strategy as intricate as Cold Start needs a civilian 
government that intimately understands the capabilities and limitations of its military 
force.  However, the civilian leadership in New Delhi has a poor track record that 
continues to the present when it comes to comprehending the complex nature of the 
armed forces.264  Without such knowledge in a Cold Start operation, the government, on 
the one hand, could overestimate its chances at success and commit an incapable force to 
a monumental problem, thus inviting disaster and defeat.265  On the other hand, the 
government could underestimate the possibility for victory and allow its force to 
dominate the battlefield that could result in unwanted escalation.  In the end, as the past 
shows, civil-military relations have colored India’s defense capabilities.  These issues are 
not easily corrected and will affect the way Cold Start is implemented. 
D. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY 
Along with civil-military issues, inter-service rivalry remains a large obstacle to a 
Cold Start strategy.  As noted earlier, not long after partition, the position of Commander- 
in-Chief was removed from the military and became the responsibility of the president of 
India.  Through the removal of the Commander-in-Chief position, the military was not 
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only reduced in stature on the national stage but it also faced a leadership vacuum with 
the absence overarching uniformed command.  As Cohen explains, “India had always had 
a Commander-in-Chief, and he had hitherto been the single source of military advice for 
the Indian government.  (The navy and air chiefs were his subordinates.)”266  Now, “the 
three chiefs were…collectively the professional military advisers to the government.”267  
Coupled with this action was the elevation of the Indian Air Force and Navy to an equal 
level with the Indian Army.  While the army continued to dominate the military in terms 
of personnel, equipment, and the budget, the equal status granted to the air force and navy 
meant that these two services could more adequately compete for resources and 
influence.  Although logical considering the new government’s desire to firmly entrench 
civilian leadership over the military, these two actions helped precipitate inter-service 
rivalry that has continued to adversely affect the armed forces for over six decades.  An 
alternative course of action that should have been considered would have been the 
establishment of a joint service command, subservient to the civilian government, but 
which would have had the power to direct the development of all three services toward 
the same unified ends.  
Still, while the equality of each service and the absence of a single military head 
have allowed inter-service rivalry to continue, the failure of the civilian government to 
establish overall military doctrine has further exacerbated the situation.  As explained 
earlier, the civilian leadership in New Delhi has a poor record of understanding the 
nature, capabilities, and limitations of the armed forces.  Consequently, no solid direction 
has been provided for military development as a whole.  As Ladwig explains:  
…the civilian leadership has not provided the kind of national vision or 
grand strategy on which the military can base its concepts for future 
missions and the forces they require. As a result, the armed services are 
often left to develop their strategies and plans without significant political 
direction – a practice that is unlikely to result in the fusion of strategic and 
military goals.268 
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In other words, because of lack of central direction, each service has had to create its own 
doctrine to fulfill what it sees as its role within the Indian defense construct.  Although 
the outbreak of war has tended to unify the armed forces because of commonality in 
purpose, this unity has tended to last only for the period of combat operations and quickly 
regresses to the prewar status quo. 
With the adoption of separate doctrines, each separate service has had to compete 
over limited resources in order to implement those doctrines.  The Indian Army, the 
largest service by far, has tended to receive the most funding annually.  As a result, the 
air force and navy have lagged behind the army in terms of doctrinal development.  
Figure 5, a graphical snapshot of a 14-year period from 1984–1998, clearly shows this 
budget allocation trend.   
 
Figure 5.   Indian defense expenditures: 1984–1998.  Reprinted, by permission, from 
Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 227.    
Figure 6, a similar compilation of data, covers a span of seven years from 2007–2014.  
Despite an intervening decade, the sector spending ratio has remained relatively 
comparable, a trend projected to continue in the near future.  This point is significant 
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when one realizes that Cold Start is an army-centric doctrine with the air force and navy 
performing supporting roles.269  The more the army dominates and is able to push its 
doctrines on the other two services, the less likely that the historical funding trend for 
these services will change.  It is far from certain that the air force and navy will accept a 
supporting role in what would be a major shift in military doctrine. 
 
Figure 6.   Indian defense expenditures: 2007–2014.  Data from Jane’s Defence Budgets, 
http://jdb.janes.com/jdb-
web/countryBudget.do?action=dashboard&country=India (accessed March 12, 
2010).270   
As Ladwig points out, “Cold Start’s full implementation is challenged by…inter-service 
rivalries…India’s air force, and to a lesser extent its navy, have sought to escape the 
army’s shadow, and are unlikely to willingly embrace a new war-fighting doctrine that 
                                                 
269 Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra.” 
270 This data was converted from U.S. dollars to Indian Rs crores using the foreign exchange rate for 
March 12, 2010.  While exchange rates fluctuate from day to day, the specific variation is not important as 
the general trend which would hold constant regardless of a given monetary value.  For official Indian 
foreign exchange rates see the Reserve Bank of India Web site, 
http://www.rbi.org.in/SCRIPTs/BS_NSDPDisplay.aspx.  Note: for ease of comparison, the format of this 
chart was replicated from the chart used in Figure 3.   
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places them in a subordinate combat role.”271  In 2001, the Indian government created an 
Integrated Defense Staff to improve inter-service relations but ensuing debates over 
centralizing military power have weakened its stature.272 
In the end, a history of inter-service rivalries will hamper the successful 
implementation of Cold Start.  A lack of unifying leadership and clear direction has led to 
bitter rivalries over doctrine and funding.  As a result, each service has developed its own 
ways of fighting that often do not mesh with those from the other services.273  While an 
Integrated Defense Staff was created to foster jointness, it lacks the capabilities and 
resources to do so.  Even with legislation, it is hard to see a joint atmosphere emerging in 
the Indian military in the near future.  This fundamental problem is a major roadblock to 
a strategy such as Cold Start. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the six decades that have passed since independence, Indian military doctrine 
has understandably undergone many iterations due to the changes in both the regional 
and international security environments, as well as shifts in its own defense outlook.  The 
Cold Start doctrine is the latest iteration in this process and poses many challenges to the 
both the Indian military and the Indian government.  By moving to an offensive strategy 
that requires rapid mobilization and independent decision making by military 
commanders, the Indian military has exposed fundamental problems in the Indian defense 
apparatus that have persisted since partition.  These issues, civil-military distrust and 
inter-service rivalries, continue to define the way defense policy and doctrine is created 
and implemented.  Ironically, while India prides itself on strong civilian control over the 
military because of what it has seen develop in Pakistan, civil-military problems are 
almost as detrimental in New Delhi as they are in Islamabad.  Inter-service rivalries, a 
derivative of civil-military distrust, also plague doctrinal shifts, depending on the service 
emphasis of a given doctrine.  In the end, Cold Start, while innovative, shows how the 
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Indian military and its relationship with the government are still mired in the past.  
Without considerable effort, it remains uncertain whether Cold Start or any strategy like 












The 2004 unveiling of the Cold Start doctrine marked the beginning of a new 
direction in the evolution of the India-Pakistan security dynamic in the nuclear world.  
While the detonation of nuclear devices in 1998 by both nations understandably 
heightened security concerns, many experts saw the introduction of overt nuclear 
capabilities on the subcontinent as a stabilizing factor for the region.  Deterrence, which 
kept the guns of the United States and the Soviet Union silent during the tense years of 
the Cold War could do the same for India and Pakistan.  India’s Cold Start, though, 
undermines the potential stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons by planning for a limited 
war under the nuclear umbrella, thus increasing the likelihood of undesirable outcomes of 
future crises despite the presence of nuclear arms.  India sees the potential threat of 
fighting a war under the shadow of nuclear weapons as a credible way to counter the 
perceived sponsorship of terrorism against the Indian state by Pakistan.  As this thesis has 
shown, though, the idea that Cold Start is the panacea for the current iteration of the 
India-Pakistan conflict and rivalry is fundamentally flawed for three major reasons: 
Pakistan’s principal-agent dilemma, escalation problems on the subcontinent, and civil-
military and inter-service rivalry issues within India. 
First, with Cold Start, India has strategically targeted the Pakistani state itself as 
the responsible party for continued terrorism in India.  Chapter III points out, though, that 
while Pakistan once utilized unconventional, asymmetric warfare as a way to balance 
India’s dominant military prowess and capabilities in the region, in recent years 
Islamabad has publicly moved to distance itself from extremist organizations that have 
launched terror attacks in Kashmir and against India proper, though that distancing has 
been “cosmetic” and relatively weak.  As a result, a principal-agent problem has 
developed in which radicals in Pakistan once sponsored by the state now act 
independently of the state and have agendas that not only are counter to that of the state 
but also threaten the state itself.  Statements by both Pakistani officials, as well as 
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terrorists themselves, attest to this fact. Thus, Pakistan’s firm, direct control of radical 
organizations it once supported is now doubtful.  Cold Start, therefore, identifies the 
wrong target strategically.  By increasing pressure on Islamabad and holding Pakistan 
accountable for every terrorist attack in India, New Delhi has created undue hostility 
between itself and Pakistan.  In fact, by specifically targeting the state, India has forced 
Pakistan to maintain a large military force on its eastern border to counter the increased 
Indian threat.  Ironically, these forces could be used to fight the very extremists, radicals, 
and terrorists that India accuses Pakistan of supporting.  Instead, the heightened security 
environment limits Pakistani capabilities in this regard, thus increasing the potential 
threat of terrorism against India. 
Next, the Cold Start doctrine is flawed operationally.  This offensive strategy 
brings to the forefront inherent problems that have plagued the India-Pakistan armed 
crises since partition in 1947, namely escalation, misperception, deception, and mistrust.  
As Chapter IV shows, all phases of conflict, from merely posturing with exercises to full 
scale war, have the potential for escalation beyond original plans, whether done 
deliberately or unintentionally.  While dangerous in a conventional environment, the 
continuation of this historical trend in the Cold Start doctrine is potentially catastrophic in 
the nuclear world.274  In the first case examined, the 1971 War, India intentionally 
escalated what was an internal conflict between two regions of Pakistan to a full scale 
war.  During the subsequent fighting, though, the rapid increase in escalation was 
unexpected.  The Indian pace of combat and advance was much quicker than anticipated 
and the resistance of Pakistani forces was much weaker than expected.  As a result, the 
Indians achieved a lopsided victory and Pakistan suffered an ignominious defeat.  In a 
Cold Start scenario one can certainly expect a much fiercer Pakistani defense posture yet 
the potential for unexpected Indian gains remains.  A multi-axis approach could easily 
limit the Pakistani response, regardless of their prowess, thus forcing Islamabad to 
                                                 
274 While India has declared a “no first use” policy in regards to nuclear weapons, Pakistan has made 
no such statement.  Instead Islamabad sees benefits in remaining ambiguous regarding its potential 
employment of nuclear weapons in a conflict.  Consequently, any crisis could easily escalate to the nuclear 
level if Pakistan deems it in its best interest to launch nuclear weapons first to prevent the destruction of the 
state.  See Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace: Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” 
International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 39. 
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consider the use of nuclear weapons to avoid a catastrophic defeat along the lines of the 
1971 bifurcation.  In such a scenario, defeat would not mean the splitting of the Pakistani 
state but the end of the state itself. 
The Brasstacks case demonstrates how easily misperception by both sides can 
lead to escalation despite intentions to the contrary.  Here, because of the history of 
mistrust, neither side believed the other when each said its military deployments and 
counter-deployments were simply part of an exercise.  Instead, both New Delhi and 
Islamabad took actions that not only failed to diffuse the crisis but exacerbated it instead.  
While diplomatic actions between the two sides eventually led to a resolution of the 
confrontation, the potential for future misperception has remained.  Such misperception 
could lead to major consequences in a Cold Start operation where deception is a key 
aspect, if Pakistan does not believe the professed limited nature of such an operation.  As 
a result, escalation to the nuclear level could result based on Islamabad’s fear of more 
nefarious Indian aims. 
In the Kargil conflict, the first war under the nuclear umbrella between India and 
Pakistan, New Delhi and Islamabad took actions toward escalation despite the possession 
of nuclear arms by both sides.  India planned to launch a counter-attack into Pakistan 
through the Rajasthan Desert, if its actions to remove Pakistanis forces from the 
mountains surrounding Kargil were ineffective.  Pakistan, fearing the potential of an 
Indian assault, increased the alert status of its nuclear weapons, a course of action it also 
took during the 2001–02 military standoff with India.  Clearly, neither side was averse to 
upping the ante regardless of the increased possibility of a nuclear exchange.  Although 
the international community was able to assist in the resolution of the issue before the 
conflict escalated beyond the point of no return, a Cold Start crisis would not have that 
safety net.  As explained earlier, Cold Start is specifically designed to limit such 
international intervention in a crisis.  Consequently, a Kargil-like conflict in the future 
could easily escalate to the nuclear level, especially if Pakistan sees it existence 
threatened and raises its nuclear alert status as it did in past conflicts with India. 
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Finally, the Cold Start strategy faces major institutional obstacles within India.  
As Chapter V explains, the new doctrine would be a major shift from India’s military 
posture of the past from one of primarily defense-orientation to one focused mainly on 
offensive warfare.  Consequently, not only would forces have to be shifted 
geographically but mindsets would also have to change.  The rapid deployment and 
multi-axis attacks envisioned by the planners of Cold Start require both a military force 
capable of independent decision-making that is trusted by the civilian leadership in New 
Delhi as well as a military that can operate jointly across all services regardless of 
parochial interests.  History, however, does not show favorable trends in either case.  Not 
only has the civilian government distrusted the Indian armed services and interfered with 
military operations, the military has also been isolated from the governmental decision-
making process.  Thus, the military lacks independence as well as the ability to 
understand what the government is trying to accomplish in a given scenario.  The case of 
the 2001–2002 military standoff with Pakistan is a good example of this ongoing tension.  
The Indian military was unsure of expected role and hamstrung by government 
limitations.  As a result, Cold Start was designed to bypass this perceived interference.  
However, during a time-sensitive crisis such as a Cold Start operation, the desire on the 
military’s part to act without government input could increase the both the potential for 
exacerbated civil-military mistrust and, in the extreme case, possible unwanted military 
action, thereby fueling an already untenable situation.  Further, not only does the 
government not fully communicate its intentions, it also does not understand the full 
capabilities of the military force, therefore creating situations where military forces are 
employed unnecessarily or inadequately.   
The military also has a poor track record regarding inter-service cooperation.  The 
Indian Army has always been the dominant service for logical reasons and as such has 
received the lion share of funding and has heavily influenced the development of Indian 
military doctrine.  Increasingly, though, the Indian Air Force and Navy have begun to 
push their own agendas and assert their independence from army-centric strategies.  With 
the lack of a single joint command structure, the history of rivalry is unlikely to abate in 
the near future and remains a major barrier for the planners of Cold Start, who envision a 
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significant use of joint operations to accomplish their aims.  In the end, the institutional 
problems inherent to India’s defense apparatuses undermine the future success of a Cold 
Start waged conflict. 
In conclusion, while an innovative approach created by India to deal with the new 
strategic environment on the subcontinent, Cold Start is not the right type of strategy that 
India should pursue for the reasons discussed above.  Beyond South Asia, these 
conclusions have relevance as well.  States attempting to formulate strategies to fight 
limited wars in the presence of nuclear weapons need to carefully examine all aspects of 
such an approach in order to determine if that strategy is the best solution for their 
security problem.  While these possibilities may seem remote, increased proliferation of 
not just weapons but nuclear technologies that could then be utilized to make weapons 
may make for an uncomfortable reality in the near future.  Returning to South Asia, the 
next section will pose alternative solutions to address the conundrum that both India and 
Pakistan face. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Pakistan — Move to End Internal Terrorism and Extremism 
Pakistan must aggressively pursue, capture, and prosecute terrorists and 
extremists within its own borders. 
As described above in recent years, Pakistan has taken important steps toward 
combating terrorism and extremism within the borders of the state.  However, Islamabad 
must do more to isolate and destroy terrorist networks that reside within Pakistan.  The 
assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 shows that while the 
government recognizes potential threats, often it fails to act to effectively counter them or 
prosecute the offenders.275  For example, LeT, while hunted by the government to some 
extent, has been allowed to resurface under different names and fronts and still function 
                                                 
275 U.N. report: Benazir Bhutto's assassination was preventable, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/04/15/pakistan.bhutto.report/index.html (accessed April 17, 
2010). 
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openly in the state.  For perceptions regarding Islamabad’s relationship with terrorists and 
extremists to change both regionally and internationally, the practice of “catch and 
release” of terrorist leaders must end.  Islamabad needs to recognize that while it used 
extremists and the like to further its agenda in Kashmir in the past, that time is now over.  
Pakistan must understand that its future security depends on this change in policy, not 
only internally but also externally in its relationship with India.  As already mentioned, 
India sees little difference between terrorists in Pakistan and the Pakistan state.  By 
curtailing terrorist and extremist activities, Pakistan can greatly lower the incentive for 
India to launch an attack.  In the end, while the costs of such a policy will be high as the 
data above shows, Pakistan has no alternative if it wishes to appear as a responsible state 
in the international community.  The United States can encourage this shift through 
increased funding and training of Pakistani counterterrorism forces.   
2. India — Focus on Internal Security and Counterterrorism 
India must focus on internal security and counterterrorism as opposed to 
conventional strategies against Pakistan. 
Although India may blame the Pakistan state for terrorism in Kashmir and India 
proper, the connection between the two is not entirely clear.  Thus, India must shift its 
stance from targeting the Pakistan state that faces its own terrorist and extremist threats to 
targeting the true threat, terrorists.  Of course India cannot do “nothing” when dealing 
with threats from an adversary.  As explained earlier, having no response when a threat 
arises encourages threat tactics to continue.  India must maintain a credible deterrence, 
but one that Islamabad can understand and appreciate, not one that has the potential of 
crushing the Pakistan state and thereby creating a security dilemma.  India must also 
revamp its internal security apparatus both to help prevent terrorism such as the 2008 
Mumbai attacks from occurring in the future, as well as respond more effectively when 
those terrorist attacks do occur.  As shown in Daniel Reed’s documentary Terror in 
Mumbai, Indian police and security forces were dumbfounded by the 2008 attacks and 
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failed to adapt adequately to the challenges posed by only ten terrorists.276  
Consequently, the attacks dragged on for three days and 172 people lost their lives.  This 
loss of life is unacceptable not only morally but politically as well.  When attacks of this 
type occur with a similar death toll, an angry population will demand a response.  In a 
democracy like India, it is hard to ignore those demands for very long.  As a result, the 
government could be forced to act in a counterproductive way toward its most likely 
target, Pakistan, whether the state is responsible or not.  By increasing security and 
counterterrorism efforts, this situation and the accompanied possibilities of crisis 
escalation can be avoided. 
3. India and Pakistan — Cooperate to Fight a Common Enemy 
India and Pakistan must move beyond decades of antagonism and instead 
cooperate against a common enemy, which threatens peace and stability between the two 
nations and in the region. 
With the introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent, India and Pakistan 
have a major incentive to resolve crises prior to the outbreak of hostilities, yet both sides 
continue to antagonize each other.  Although peace dialogues have been initiated over the 
years since the 1998 tests, they have been derailed by military maneuvers or terrorism.  
Islamabad and New Delhi must come to understand the precarious nature of their current 
relationship and take constructive steps to establish lasting peace.  One way to do this is 
to cooperate on an issue that affects both nations, namely terrorism.  Terrorism anywhere 
is a scourge but in South Asia, terrorism threatens the stability of the region since India 
and Pakistan have tended to take counterproductive stances toward the issue.  As 
explained above, Pakistan has hunted terrorists only minimally while India has targeted 
Pakistan as the mastermind behind various incidents within India and Kashmir.  As a 
result, antagonism and mistrust has grown as has the audacity of terrorists who have an 
incentive in destabilizing the region and undermining potential peace overtures.  
Islamabad and New Delhi must reverse this trend by cooperating to combat this common 
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foe.  Such a proposition is not without precedent.  During the Cold War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union cooperated on the initial development of a nuclear nonproliferation 
regime that both saw as being mutually beneficial.277  Even on the subcontinent, 
cooperation on a strategic issue is not without precedent.  Beginning in the 1960s, both 
India and Pakistan were able to reach agreements on water and river rights in the Indus 
basin that have continued despite the outbreak of wars and crises.278  Ironically, such a 
resource issue could be seen as even more important than disputed Kashmir because of 
the strategic value of this water source.  In the end, through cooperation on a common 
issue, India and Pakistan can start to move beyond their historical animosities. 
Without cooperation, the possibility of fighting a full scale war over terrorism 
according to the Cold Start doctrine increases greatly.  Rather than correcting the 
problem, the threat of this strategy would destabilize the region further in two major 
ways.  First, military forces used to combat extremism and terrorism in the frontier 
regions of Pakistan would be moved to counter a potential Indian invasion.  As a result, 
the terrorism would likely increase in both Pakistan and India.  Ironically, by threatening 
to attack Pakistan because of terrorism, India would make itself more vulnerable to 
terrorism.  Second, as in the past, Pakistan would most likely increase its nuclear alert 
status during a Cold Start crisis.  In this status, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be 
vulnerable to terrorists who could not only find and attack those sites but also steal an 
intact weapon.  The consequences of the theft of a nuclear weapon in Pakistan could be 
catastrophic regionally and globally.  Of course, these propositions are but a few of a 
wide range of others that could create instability in a Cold Start era.  Suffice it to say, 
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